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Glossary 
 
ābī..................................irrigated farm land 
ādat/rawāj........................customary/common law 
alafcha ............................lit, “little, or small, grass” grazing land in village 
ailāq ...............................upland pasture 
amīr................................king 
amlāk ..............................properties (plural of “mulk”) 
arbāb ..............................appointed village leader 
aryat/jaizī/gerau/rahn .........pledge or mortgage 
alāqadārī ..........................village/mantiqa administration sub-district, the lowest 
official administrative unit 
arzān...............................cheap 
alaqa...............................area, ward, mantiqa 
alāqadār...........................government appointed village representative/liaison officer 
reporting to wulswali or district governor 
bazgah.............................sharecropper 
birenj ..............................rice 
bāī..................................landowner, trader, rich man 
būta................................bush 





firmān .............................state order/decree 
gandum............................wheat 
gau .................................cow (barley is jau) 
gharībkār..........................daily paid labourers/the very poor 
gerau/bai jaez....................lease/paw/mortgage 
geraudar...........................the person to whom land is pawned or mortgaged 
huqūq..............................law (primarily religious) 
ezāfa...............................excess land above ceiling 
jerīb................................one-fifth of a hectare 
jawārī..............................maize 
khākbād ...........................dust storm 
khār/khār buta ...................prickly bushes 
khass...............................brushwood 
kāh .................................straw 
kābulī sīr ..........................14 pau equivalent to 7.264 kg 
kabaghal...........................destitute 
kunjid..............................sesame 
kōknār .............................poppy plant 
lalmī ...............................dryland farming/rain-fed agriculture land 
lubiyā ..............................red kidney bean 
loyi sāranwāl......................public prosecutor 
māldār.............................herd owner 
mehr ...............................marriage gift made to wife, may be property 
mālik...............................landlord, owner 
mantiqa ...........................area, ward, territory, cluster of villages with a linked 
identity 
mīr .................................leader, commander, tribal chief 
mustūfīyat ........................finance department 
māsh ...............................grass pea 
maimana sīr.......................twice that of Kabuli sīr, equivalent to 14.528 kg 
mimcha............................middle peasant 
mirās...............................inheritance 
mullāh .............................religious teacher, mosque prayer leader 
mujāhid ...........................Holy Warriors fighting in jihad, or Holy War (pl. mujahidin) Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       v 
mirāb ..............................water manager/water bailiff 
nakhud.............................chickpea 
nanawatī ..........................asylum/sanctuary 
paimana ...........................sieve, used also to measure crop shares 
qariya/qeshlāq/dēh .............village 
qrut ................................dried yoghourt curds 
rāsh ................................bank (e.g. of canal or river) 
rishqa..............................fodder crop 
shari’a .............................Islamic law 
shūra...............................community committee 
Shūra-yi  Nizar....................Panjshiri Military/Political Party Council established by 
Massoud 
zamīn-i shakhsī...................privately owned land 
shōr daryā ........................saline river or river bed 
shudkar............................grazing land 
seghir ..............................oil seed 
tariyāq.............................opium 
ushr ................................Islamic obligatory tithe on land and produce 
usha................................communal work 
ummah.............................religious community comprising only of Muslims 
waqfī...............................land endowed for religious purposes 
wasayeq shari’a ..................legal (religious) documents 
wasiyat khat ......................last will and testament 




Dates:  Laws are indicated by their Afghan date. Excepting the Taliban regime, 
which used the Arabic lunar calendar, Afghanistan follows a solar calendar 
beginning in 622 AD, the year of the Hijrat. The first day of the year 
coincides with the first day of spring (the month of Hamal) which, except in 
a leap year, falls on 21 March in the Common Era. The approximate 
corresponding western date is derived by adding 621 years, two months and 
21 days to the Afghan date.  
 
MONTHS 
Hamal begins March 21
st  
Sawr begins April 21
st 
Jawzā begins May 22
nd 
Saratān begins June 22
nd 
Asad begins July 23rd 
Sumbula begins August 23
rd 
Mizān begins September 23
rd 
Aqrab begins October 23
rd 
Qaus begins November 22
nd 
Jadi begins December 22
nd 
Dawl begins January 21
st 




Note on Transliteration:  Many  place  names in the text have been recorded 
phonetically and may be incorrectly spelt. The most 
doubtful have been placed in parentheses.  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Executive Summary 
 
This report presents the findings from a field study conducted in Faryab Province in 
November 2003. It represents the second of three field studies on rural land 
relations conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
1 A 
synthesis and critical analysis arising from these three studies will be published by 
AREU in summer 2004. 
 
Fieldwork for this study was conducted in three districts immediately adjacent to 
Maimana City: the districts of Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Musa and Khwaja Sabz Posh. 
Together these form a central belt in Faryab Province where intensively (usually 
irrigated) farmed land gives way to rain-fed agriculture and wide-ranging pasture. 
Each district represents a socio-spatial mosaic of discrete mantiqa, averaging five 
villages. Interviews were undertaken in 11 villages in six mantiqa. 
 
The main findings of this study include the following: 
 
•  Land relations are in disarray. Rural land relations are currently deeply 
disturbed in Faryab, with abundant disputes over ownership and access. 
These reach well beyond routine boundary and inheritance disputes. Many 
spill over into violence. Many disputes also are expressed along ethnic lines 
or are fuelled by ethnic tension.  
 
•  Pasture land is at the centre of dispute. The outstanding focus of disputes 
is not homes and farms, but pasture land. This is a critical resource in a 
region where most live by livestock and crop farming. Claims and counter-
claims over pasture are both triggered by, and established by, conversion of 
pasture into rain-fed farms. Pasture disputes involve and affect large 
numbers of people, including the landless; are communal and inflammatory 
in nature; and are the most difficult conflicts to resolve.  
 
•  Historical tensions and poor policy propel problems. Difficulties arise not 
only from their ethnic colouring and associated bitter inter-ethnic histories 
related to pasture access, but from the unsound policy environment that 
generated these problems over the last century. This includes, for example:  
  The state’s appropriation of all pasture as its own domain, an act which 
dispossessed local communities of precious communal properties and 
truncated the opportunity for locally regulated allocation systems to 
evolve to meet the demands of modern land pressures; 
  An opaque definition of “public land” as indeterminantly belonging to 
the nation or government, and related unclarity as to the powers of 
government as administrator and allocator; 
  Unfair bias in the allocation of pasture rights towards Pushtun and 
seasonal users; 
  Lack of clarity as to the nature of pasture rights as either use rights or 
outright ownership of the resource; and 
  Unsatisfactory or non-existent adjudication processes which have 
allowed wealthy landlords in the community to be registered as the 
owners rather than trustees of substantial communal pastureland; 
 
                                                 
1 The other two studies were, respectively, a minor field study of land relations in Bamyan Province and an 
examination of the Shiwa Pastures in Badakhshan. Both studies are available from AREU’s web site 
(www.areu.org.af).  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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•  Disorder creates an environment ripe for land tensions and seizure of 
land by the elite. War and factionalism has provided an environment in 
which land occupations and changing land use have been allowed and even 
encouraged to occur. Warlords and their increasing economic opportunism 
have played a particularly pernicious role and in some areas continue to do 
so. The fall of the Taliban generated a new wave of ethnically disposed 
pastoral disputes that have continued up until the present era. 
 
  Removing warlords may not, however, be sufficient to resolve those 
disputes. This is because of the structural problems in the conception and 
management of pastoral access noted above and because current problems 
have their origins in large part in resentments that have been simmering for 
several generations. These resentments started with land colonisation of 
Faryab by Pushtuns, which began in an organised fashion in 1885 and 
continued in sporadic and voluntary fashion up until the 1970s. In the early 
decades, Pushtuns acquired farmland and pasture by being granted the 
confiscated properties of Uzbek notables and by assuming that other lands 
were largely unowned and vacant. From the 1930s, land colonisation was 
felt locally in the form of favoured allocations of public lands (pasture) to 
mainly Pustun nomads. In addition, the government’s own projects 
converting public pasture to farmland in the 1980s helped set 
environmentally unsound precedents and tenure norms. Thus, the roots of 
these current conflicts need to be tackled if resolution is to be lasting. 
 
To begin to deal with these tensions, this paper sets forth the following 
recommendations: 
 
•  Initiate localised and community-based approaches. Action to restore 
order in land relations will need to take local history into account for 
lasting resolution to be achieved. It will also need to avoid decision-making 
on pastoral land rights only on the basis of proffered legal documents. As 
well as possessing low local legitimacy, these documents are often 
corrupted, with the courts themselves known to have endorsed wrongful 
allocations under duress or otherwise.  
 
Nor will decision-making, policymaking or lawmaking at the centre be 
sufficiently nuanced or practically grounded to be effective. A pasture by 
pasture community-based process of pasture use planning, decision-making 
and regulation offers the most promising route forward.  
 
Creating peace on the pastures will contribute to sound governance norms 
generally. In the process, peace on the pasture lands, sustained by 
registered agreements involving all disputants as to access, could be 
incrementally delivered. Important contributions towards a more workable, 
fair and sustainable rural tenure policy would also arise from this 
development. This includes the urgent need to draw policy and operational 
distinctions between pastures appropriately owned and regulated in the 
national domain (public land) and those more viably (and customarily) held 
and regulated at local community level. Systems for satisfactorily layering 
and supervising pasture access and adherence to agreed restrictions on 
arable conversion would also be identified through practical testing. 
Systems for ensuring that the rights of the landless to access communal and 
public grazing resources could also be instituted, of particular importance 
to this group as smallstock are usually their single capital asset. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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•  Develop different approaches for rural vs. urban, and private vs. 
communal land disputes. The survey also concludes that it will be 
important for the administration to adopt a plural approach to restoring 
order in land relations for the results to be effective and lasting. Casual 
promotion of classical cadastral approaches or insistence upon restoring 
rights recognition systems to an imagined utopia of the 1970s will not be 
fruitful with respect to pastures. Distinctly tailored approaches need to be 
adopted in urban and rural areas, and within the rural sphere, towards 
properties which are held individually (houses, irrigated farms and shops) 
and shared resources (pasture, water, forests). Even in respect to the 
former, it will be wise to explore and test recordation approaches that are 
highly simplified and stem from locally owned and sustained procedures. 
 
•  Reconciliation is the key. Decisions as to ownership and access rights over 
shared resources like pasture (and water and forests) must be founded upon 
reconciliation and shared agreement, not narrow adherence to highly 
disputed paper claims. Clarification as to the conditions in which private 
rights over pasture may and may not occur will also emerge; through 
insufficiently nuanced land registration policies from the 1960s, many 
landlords (and warlords) have been able to secure public and customary 
common assets as their private domain, generating dispute. 
 
•  Greater clarity as to social units is needed. The survey provides a range 
of other findings relating to landlessness and classes in the rural 
community. One general strategic conclusion drawn is that it is important 
for development agencies to much more rigorously identify and work within 
locally constructed understanding of “community area.” The survey found 
(as found previously in Bamyan) that a community is more properly 
constituted not in a single village but in a cluster of villages/hamlets (best 
described as mantiqa) and it is this whole which identifies its shared space 
or “territory.” This will be a helpful construct for advancing community-
based land administration (and related governance tasks). For statistical 
purposes, failure to take the mantiqa or comparable socio-spatial clustering 
as the working unit, may result in highly skewed findings. In land ownership 
for example, one village in the mantiqa may comprise mainly land owners 
while others comprise mainly landless families. A third may constitute an 
evenly mixed group. All villages/hamlets in the mantiqa need to be 
included to afford an accurate picture of landholding. The same principle 
holds true for a range of social and developmental matters. 
 
•  Address the issues of homelessness. It also is apparent that a significant 
body of rural households are homeless as well as landless and have 
traditionally survived through selling their labour to land owners on a 
temporary (one to two year) basis. Because they are not regarded as 
permanent members of the target community, or indeed often of any 
community, this group of extremely disadvantaged tends to be ignored and 
excluded. In land matters this directly concerns secure access to public and 
common pasturelands. Tentatively, this survey found that this group is also 
likely not among those who benefit from significant supplementary off-farm 
and out-migration incomes. Attention to homelessness in rural areas (as 
well as urban areas) could be one of more productive stepping stones to 
poverty alleviation as well as loosening the conventions of oppressive social 
relations.   Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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I.   Introduction 
 
A. Purpose  of  the  Study 
 
This paper represents a second field study on the subject of rural land ownership in 
Afghanistan, undertaken in Faryab Province (Map 1) in November 2003. The first 
study was conducted in the central province of Bamyan in June 2003.
2 A third 
report arising out of longer-term study of land relations in Badakhshan was 
published by AREU in May 2004.
3 A synthesis of findings from these three papers 
will be released by AREU in late summer 2004.  
 
The objective of these short studies was to steeply increase ground knowledge 
about rural land relations through localised study in different parts of the country. 
This proceeds from a background study of secondary research carried out in 
October 2002.
4 The overriding conclusion of the study was that land relations in 
Afghanistan are deeply disturbed and this is contributing to difficulties with 
achieving real peace and stability. Conflicts do not arise only from the disorder of 
the war years and after; many have their roots in the conditions prior to 1978, 
including in the policies of the central state. Attention to these is needed to afford 
lasting resolution.  
 
B.  A Snapshot of Land Relations 
 
Limitations on resources and time mean that the first two field studies do not 
represent in-depth research but rapid reconnaissance, and are therefore referred 
to as minor field studies. In Faryab Province, transport and security problems and 
the need to travel and work strictly within daylight hours during a month of already 
short days (November 2003) added to limitations. Aside from several days spent in 
Maimana City interviewing officials
5 (and widows), only seven days were spent in 
the rural community. Once there, difficulties with interpretation further frustrated 
data collection. 
 
To save time, fieldwork was conducted only in three districts immediately adjacent 
to Maimana City: the districts of Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Musa and Khwaja Sabz Posh 
(hereafter KSP). Together these form a central belt in Faryab Province where 
intensively (usually irrigated) farmed land gives way to rain-fed agriculture and 
wide-ranging pasture. Schelhas provides an overview of agriculture in the area 
under the categorisation of Turkestan Plains and Northern Mountains and Foothills, 
with figures for pre-drought wheat, rice, wheat and barley production. Rain-fed 
cultivation predominates, with fallows of between 3-5 years. Fertiliser use and 
mechanisation are very low. Livestock numbers are high.
6  
 
Many problems were experienced in collecting background data on the area, found 
to be scant, out-dated and contradictory. The exact boundaries of the province, 
                                                 
2 Alden Wily, L. Land Relations in Bamyan Province: Findings from a 15 Village Case Study. Kabul: Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit. August 2003.  
3 See Patterson, M. The Shiwa Pastures 1978-2003. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004. 
4 See Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit. March 2003. Also see Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution. Kabul: Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit. July 2003. These and the above-mentioned paper on Bamyan are available at AREU’s website: 
www.areu.org.af or may be acquired in hard copy from AREU. 
5 See Appendix A for list of officials interviewed. 
6 Schelhas, B. Promotion of Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Programs Farming Systems. Rome: FAO. 
1996, 9-10. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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districts and even number of districts in the province have long been in flux for 30 
or more years. Nor do such statistics as were ascertained compare consistently 
with information collected in the field. The most complete data availed was from 
InterSoS, an NGO operating in the three survey districts selected. InterSoS has 
recently surveyed villages in these areas but has not recorded the crucial socio-
spatial clustering of villages in mantiqa (wards) (also known as mohalla or alaqa). 
Population data are changing as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
slowly return. Table 1 summarises InterSoS data together and their breakdown into 
mantiqa as ascertained by this survey.  
 
Table 1: Population Data for Survey Districts 
 












Shirin Tagab  87 12  16,356  188  1,363 
 








24 11,569  113 482 
TOTAL 228 42  36,356    159  866 
 
Sources: This survey & InterSoS. 
 
Each district represents a socio-spatial mosaic of discrete mantiqa, averaging five 
villages. A mantiqa is generally but not always ethnically distinct. Where this is not 
the case, people of different ethnic groups usually live within their own villages or 
at least in their own neighbourhood of a mixed village. Uzbeks are the majority in 
the three survey districts (Table 2) and in Faryab Province as a whole. Shirin Tagab 
is the most ethnically mixed area, with significant numbers of Arab and Pushtun 
communities. Turkmen, Tajiks and “Mongol” in these districts are few.
7 
 
Table 2: Dominant Ethnicity of Villages in the Three Survey Districts 2003 
 
SHIRIN TAGAB  KHWAJA SABZ 
POSH 
KHWAJA MUSA  TOTAL   
No. 
 
%  No. %  No. %  No. % 
Uzbek  39 44.8  68 66.6  21 54 128  56 
Arab  23 26.4  15 14.7  7  18 45 20 
Pushtun  19 21.8  6  5.9  7  18 32 14 
Tajik    9  8.8    9  4 
Turkmen    1  1    1  0.4 
Mongol    3  2.9    3  1.3 
Mixed Uzbek-Pushtun  4 4.6      2 5 6 2.6 
Mixed Arab-Uzbek  2 2.3      1 2.5  3 1.3 




















Source: Collated from data provided by InterSoS. 
 
Interviews were undertaken in 11 villages in six mantiqa (Table 3). Mantiqa were 
not randomly selected but chosen for their accessibility and ethnic composition. As 
                                                 
7 Although InterSoS identifies these people as Mongol (or Mughal, the Persian version of the Turkic word Mongol), 
Jonathan Lee suggests that they are more likely linked to either the Arlat or Chaghatai sub-tribes of Uzbeks. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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this report will demonstrate, ethnic affiliation is deeply significant in land relations 
in this province.  
 
Table 3: Survey Sites 2003 
 





Interviewees Information  Collected 
on: 
1  Takhta Bazaar  Arab  10 men  14 landowners 






2  Arlan  Arab  5 men  8 landowners 
3 landless  
 







4  Elbegi 
5  Qala-yi Shaikhi 












6  Islam Qala 
 












7  Khoja Charkhi 





8  Baluch 






Pasture use only 




Gurzad 10  Gurzad  Uzbek  & 
Arabs 
 




    Uzbek  27 women  27 widows 












With exceptions, interviews were held in groups of mainly men (79 percent) and 
involved more than 160 persons. Half the interviewees were Uzbek (49 percent), 11 
percent were Pushtuns and 40 percent were Arabs. Precise information on the 
landholding status of 227 individuals was collected.  
 
The next section of this paper provides a socio-historical background to land 
relations in the study area. Chapter III presents the findings of current land 
relations from the 11 study villages. This is followed by a chapter outlining the 
landholding status of women in the districts. Finally, chapter V provides 
conclusions and recommendations for policymakers. 
 Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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II.   Historical Background on Faryab Province 
 
A. The  Study  Area 
 
Faryab is one of 34 provinces in modern Afghanistan.
8 It lies in the extreme north-
west, bordering Turkmenistan. Jauzjan and Sar-i Pul Provinces lie to the east and 
Ghor and Badghis Provinces to the south (Map 1). The province is predominantly 
dry, enduring Siberian winds in winter and dust storms (khakbad) in the summer. 
The mountain snow of the southern districts (Belchiragh and Kohistan) eventually 
feeds and often floods the two main north-flowing rivers of the study area, known 
as Shirin Tagab and Ab-i Maimana. A third river, Ab-i Qaysar, joins the Shirin Tagab 
further north of the study area in Dawlatabad District. The study area falls within 
that part of Faryab famous for its unusually high, undulating sandy dunes (chul) 
that nonetheless sustain both rich pasture and often rain-fed cultivation. 
 
Large areas that are more definitively deserts dominate both the border area 
towards Turkmenistan and the east adjoining Jauzjan Province. These also have 
long histories as seasonal pastures for both settled and nomadic communities. The 
latter desert, Dasht-i-Laili, is famous for its magnificent carpet of spring flowers. It 
is also infamous for the massacres that occurred there in recent history and the 
now emerging wind and soil erosion arising from mechanised cultivation in the last 
decade or so. Both matters are discussed in this report.  
 
Faryab Province historically has been predominantly agro-pastoral with an 
extensive degree of pastoral transhumance practised up until the present. Early 
occupants were often nomadic stock owners.
9 Rangeland accounts for two-thirds of 
the area. Over 30 percent of the province today is cultivated as rain-fed farms, 
nearly all of it on sloping land (Table 4). Less than seven percent of the area is 
under irrigation and this includes irrigation through seasonal flooding. 
 
Faryab Province is currently divided into 16 districts (Appendix B), some of 
uncertain status.  There is in addition the municipality of Maimana “City” run by its 
own mayor, which exerts a notable degree of administrative and fiscal 
independence.
10 Provincial and district boundaries have been fluid since 1978 as 
local commanders attempted (and still attempt) to carve out their own domains 
and alliances. Appendix B provides notes on the current period (late 2003). 
Commanders in the north have looked to Shibarghan where General Dostam and his 
Junbesh military faction/party were based. The carpet production and trade of 
Andkhui and the border customs post at Aquina heightened Shibarghan’s interest to 
bring these areas under their own aegis. Easier road access has also helped orient 
the four northern districts towards Shibarghan. Thus, although these remain 
technically under Maimana, they are in practice under Jauzjan Province. The 




                                                 
8 Faryab did not become a province until 1964. From the administrative reforms of the 1930s until then it was 
known as Maimana and was a sub-province of Balkh Province, which had its headquarters in Mazar-i-Sharif (Pain, 
A. Livelihoods under stress in Faryab Province, Northern Afghanistan. Opportunities for Support. A Report to Save 
the Children (USA), Pakistan/Afghanistan Field Office. October 2001). It comprised seven districts with around two 
sub-districts in each (alaquadaris), a level of sub-national administration that was abandoned in the 1970s.  
9 Yate as cited in Tapper, N. “The advent of Pushtun maldars in north-western Afghanistan.” Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 1973; XXXVI: 55-79. 
10 Refer to Lee, J. “The History of Maimana in Northwestern Afghanistan 1731-1893.” Iran Journal of Persian 
Studies. 1987. 25; 107-124 for the 18
th and 19
th century history of Maimana, an ancient settlement. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Table 4: Land Cover in Faryab Province, 1993 
 
Category  Area in Ha 
 
% 
Urban land  641  0.03 
Orchards 7,681  0.3 
Irrigated land 1 crop per year  52,288  2.6 
Irrigated periodically
11 81,535  4.0 
Valley rain-fed land  5,418  0.3 
Hilly rain-fed land  620,588  30.5 
Forests
12 0  0 
Rangeland 898,218  44.2 
Rocky barren land  6,638  0.3 
Sandy barren land
13 354,949  17.5 
Marshes 680  0.03 
Rivers 992  0.04 
Permanent snow  0  0 
TOTAL 2,029,628  100 
        Source: 1993 Landcover Statistics in FAO 1999 
 
Several other districts in Faryab have sub-divided themselves, generally along the 
sub-district boundaries of previous decades (see Appendix B).
14  Factionalism and 
“empire building” on the part of warlords drive this. It also represents an attempt 
by local level officials to secure the infrastructural benefits that are now promised 
to accrue to new districts, such as construction of a school, clinic and bazaar.
15  A 
frustrating effect of these changes is that district-based data are unreliable and 
even unusable on such matters as land area, proportions of irrigated, rain-fed and 
pasture land, numbers of settlements and population.
16 Of the three districts 
visited by this survey, one does not appear at all in most documents (Khwaja Musa) 
and one erratically so (Khwaja Sabz Posh, or KSP). Maps share these problems. 
Even the widely-used maps of the Afghanistan Information Management Service 
(AIMS) do not reflect up-to-date boundaries of districts on the ground. The 2003 
survey being carried out by InterSoS in Maimana is therefore all the more valuable.  
 
B.  Faryab in the Past 
 
Because the history of Faryab is directly relevant to issues of territoriality and 
private tenure today, it needs to be briefly recounted. Much of this history depends 
upon the location of the province on the gateway between north and south Asia, 
either on the Silk Route or in more recent centuries, as the frontline buffer 
between the expanding interests of the British and Russian empire-builders — most 
recently revisited in the form of the Russian occupation from the north in 1979 
(although neighbouring Shibarghan was to become the Soviet headquarters of the 
north, not Maimana). 
                                                 
11 Generally through spring flooding. 
12 However, the Ministry of Agriculture claims 76,700 ha of pistachio forests in seven districts, although he 
acknowledges that up to 80% has been destroyed since 1978 (Pers comm., Abdul Satar Borez, Maimana). 
13 Much of this is used as seasonal pasture. 
14 Up until 1964 provinces were governed at four levels: by the Provincial Governor (Wali) at the Province 
(Wilayat), by the Sub-Governor (Loy Woluswali) at Sub-Province, by the District Governor (Woluswali) at District 
level and by Administrators (Alaqadaris) at Sub-District level. 
15 Wilder, A. Governance/Political Issues Faryab Trip Notes. 2003. 
16 Such as presented, for example, by SCA (Swedish Committee for Agriculture). The Agricultural Survey of 
Afghanistan. Sixth Report 1988 and 1989 Surveys.  Kabul: SCA. 1990 and FAO-UNDP. Provincial Landcover Atlas of 
Islamic State of Afghanistan, 1999. Kabul: FAO-UNDP. 1999. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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The Pre-Islamic Period 
The history of settlement in Faryab is ancient and comprises layer upon layer of 
occupation, but which unfortunately (as this short survey will show) has not yet 
attained the status of “melting pot” within which a host of cultures have merged 
into a non-conflictual whole or at least peaceable coexistence.
17 Maimana and 
Andkhui actually entered written history 2,500 years ago when Jews arrived and 
settled in 586 BC, fleeing the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar.
18 The 
area was under Persian control at the time,
19 which gave way in due course to 
“barbaric and despotic” Greek control following conquest by Alexander the Great 
in 326 BC.
20 Persian dominance was restored from the 3
rd to 7
th century AD.  
 
Islamic Conquest 
What is now perceived as the pre-Islamic period ended with the conquest of 
northern Afghanistan by Arab Muslims (651-661 AD). Lee describes this period as 
one in which the area “turned into a vast battlefield as the two great Arab and 
Persian cultures battled for not only political and geographical supremacy but 
ideological supremacy.”
21 It took a full century for Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, 
Nestorian Christianity and indigenous pagan cults to be finally swept away by the 




The Chingizid Empire 
Life was greatly altered with the destructive invasion of Ghengis Khan and his 
“Mongol Horde” from 1220 AD. As he moved into the area from the north, cities 
and towns including Maimana were razed, populations massacred, grain, fields and 
livestock stolen or burnt and ancient irrigation systems obliterated.
23 This Turco-
Mongol rule over what was to be named Balkh was to last 500 years; this covered 
the modern provinces of Faryab, Jauzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz and Baghlan. 
British officials were later to name this area Afghan Turkestan.
24 Control by the 
descendants of Ghengis Khan (Chingizids) stemmed from the alternating capitals of 
Bukhara or Samarkand north of the Amu Darya River. They ruled in a decentralised 
manner, however, allowing local amirs in Maimana and elsewhere considerable 




Uzbek occupation of the north began within the Chingizid period. In 1500, Uzbek 
princes (themselves a Turco-Mongol product) swept across the Amu Darya, reaching 
Faryab and related areas around 1505. They joined a substantial and largely 
pastoral Arab population. 
 
                                                 
17 Refer to Lee, J. The ‘Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901. New York: 
Brill, Leiden. 1996. Chapter One provides an excellent overview of the history of the area. Also see Chapter One in 
Gregorian, V. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. California: 
Stanford University Press. 1969. 
18 When Arabs arrived and settled there in the 8
th century AD, they changed the name of Maimana from Al-
Yahudiyya (“City of Jews”) to Maimana, meaning good luck or prosperity; Lee 1996, op cit. 6-7. Also see Lee, 
1987, op cit. 
19 Achaemenid Empire: 6
th-4
th centuries BC. 
20 Graeco-Bactrian Kingdom: 4
th-2
nd centuries BC. 
21 Lee 1996, op cit., 10. 
22 Saffavids 870-890 AD, Samanids 874-999 AD, Ghaznanawids 999-1186 AD, Seljuks 1038-1157 AD and Ghurids 1150-
1217. 
23 Lee 1996, op cit., 14 ff. 
24 The area has at times also been called Khurasan, particularly in very recent times, not to be confused with the 
use of that name for Persia. 
25 Lee 1996, op cit., xii ff. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Pushtun Domination 
As tsarist Russia and Britain began to fight for hegemony over the region, northern 
control of Balkh gave way, leaving around ten small and mutually hostile Khanates, 
of which Andkhui and Maimana were two. Expansionism into the north by the 
Afghan amirs (Pushtun amirs) occurred during this period in the hands of Durrani 
Ahmad Shah in 1722. His control of the north was uncertain and following his death 
in 1747, local Uzbek amirs largely reasserted their internecine autonomy with weak 
Afghan (Pushtun) dominance from the south.  
 
It was not until a century later that the north was thoroughly annexed by the south 
and brought into what thereby evolved into the modern Afghanistan state. This 
arose not only from the personal vision of Amir Abd al-Rahman (1880-1901) but 
from the longstanding ambitions of the British India colonial state for the creation 
of a buffer state between it and Russia. The path towards this was mixed, the 
important Mingid principality of Maimana being the last of the Uzbek Khanates to 
resist Afghan control (1893/94). Nonetheless, it did fall, and under Abd al-Rahman, 
the subjugation of the north in general and its “Pushtunisation” began in earnest. 
 
Pushtun Colonisation 
This policy of “Afghanisation” (as it was in fact described in the 1880s) was to have 
an enormous impact upon all social relations in the north, land relations included. 
Up until 1880 Pushtuns in the north numbered less than 3,500 households or under 
five percent of an estimated population of 87,000 families.
26 Most were Pushtuns 
who had remained in the area following a century of ambivalent control by 
Muhammadzai Amirs. Pushtun numbers first accelerated with Abd al-Rahman’s 
exiling of political prisoners to “Afghan Turkestan” in 1882.
27 Loyal Aimaq were 
also sent to border areas to help limit incursions from Russian-dominated 
territories. Following an important incident in which the Aimaq were unable to 
prevent the loss of several thousand square miles of territory (the Pandjeh incident 
of March 1885),
28 the British urged Abd al-Rahman to replace these settlers with 
more loyal settlers from his own tribe (Durrani Pushtun).
29  This catalysed formally 
planned mass colonisation of the north, to last throughout Abd al-Rahman’s reign, 
on both a voluntary and coerced basis. Abd al-Rahman saw this as a means to both 




Both Tapper (1973) and Lee (1996) provide detailed accounts of the process, based 
upon meticulous examination of India Office and other records. Their accounts 
differ to the extent that, while acknowledging the role of the British in prompting 
and supporting the amir, Tapper perhaps too uncritically accepts the much-
recorded justifications made by both British officials and the amir that the valuable 
lands of what are now Badghis and Faryab were essentially vacant lands, following 
Turkomen attacks and enslavement of Uzbek populations.
31  In the process, Tapper 
does, however, elaborate the economic drivers in Abd al-Rahman’s ambitions: not 
                                                 
26 Tapper 1973, op cit. Lee 1996, op cit. 
27 Lee 1996, op cit., 481ff. 
28 The Panjdeh debacle brought Britain and Russia close to war (Tapper 1973, op cit., 58-60; Lee 1996, op cit., 
Chapter Nine; Dupree, N. An Historical Guide to Afghanistan (Revised and Enlarged). Kabul: Afghan Air Authority, 
Afghani Tourist Organization. 1977.) 
29 Lee 1996, op cit., 421ff; Tapper 1973, op cit. 59-60. 
30 The Ghilzais and other recalcitrant tribes who opposed the amir tended to be sent to Balkh, where there was a 
strong garrison to overawe them. Some Ghilzais also found a home in the Maimana area between the town and the 
northern border and in time expanded their occupation. Pushtun Kot is so named because of the predominance of 
Pushtuns in the district. Durrani Pushtuns such as the Ishaqzais were sent to Badghis and the Murghab frontier with 
the promise of permanent grassland and pasture (personal comm., J.L. Lee). Also see Tapper 1973, op cit. for a 
detailed account of settlement. 
31 Tapper 1973, op cit., 56ff. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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only had he grown up in the north and badly wanted it to be part of his kingdom, 
he regularly pronounced himself delighted with the obvious fertility of the north 
and espoused his vision of turning the area “into a vast cultivated and inhabited 
place” that would yield much wealth for the royal purse. British officials helpfully 
concurred.
32 Lee provides a very detailed account of the political to-ing and fro-ing 




In any event, Afghanisation was launched on November 1, 1885, with the 
deportation of Aimaqs and the occupation of their lands by Pushtun nomads, told 
to become cultivators.
34  Firman (land grants) were systematically issued to the 
colonists. Clashes with the still many existing local populations predictably arose, 
especially as they were forced to build shelters for the arrivals and to sell their 
produce to the nomads (who had no experience of settled agriculture) when 
drought occurred. In addition they had to pay taxes to help cover the costs the 
assisted colonisation. By the end of 1888 some 18,000 Pushtun families were 
settled in the north.
35 Volunteers were well supported by the king, with free land, 
tools, tax concessions on yields and travel expenses. The “strongest” were sent to 
Maimana but colonies spread throughout Afghan Turkestan, with concentrations in 
Baghlan, Balkh and Sar-i Pul.
36 
 
By no means were all Afghans/Pushtuns who were sent north volunteers. Even 
many Durrani Pushtuns had to be flattered, cajoled, bribed and eventually heavily 
taxed to be forced from their home areas.
37 Once they arrived in the north, few 
made attempts at cultivation as instructed, and famine and drought resulted 
initially in mass losses of sheep. Uzbek-Pushtun tensions soared when the king 
recruited 12,000 Uzbeks to put down the Ghilzai rebellion in the south (1886).
38 
Many Ghilzai in the north fled to Persia or attempted to return south. Turmoil and 
oppression continued, and not surprisingly, exiled Afghans were among those who 
supported the (failed) rebellion of the Pashtun leader in the north, Ishaq Khan in 
1888 against his cousin, King Abd al-Rahman.
39  
 
Conditions became more settled and during the 1890s, Pushtuns who had no 
intention of cultivating also began moving voluntarily into the north, at first 
seasonally. These Kuchis were “delighted” with the potential wealth of the 
pastures compared to those of their homeland.
40 Increasingly they settled down 
there.
41 Invaluable local karakul sheep were added to their fat-tailed flocks, 
dramatically boosting values.
42 Leading Pushtun maldars especially flourished 
economically and laid claim to ever-increasing areas of both pasture and arable 
lands, helped with formal grants over large estates owned by amirs and leading 
families.
43 Land disputes with local Uzbek and Arab populations multiplied, but 
with Pushtun interests officially steadfastly supported. Tapper records that the 
                                                 
32 For example, Yate explained that the”supply of water had been far in excess of requirements,” while another 
explained how it was known it would only take a few years “to turn these wastelands into a granary to eclipse the 
Herat Valley” (Tapper 1973, op cit., 56). 
33 Lee 1996, op cit. 
34 Ibid, 479. 
35 Ibid, 484. 
36 Tapper 1973, op cit., 73. 
37 Lee 1996, op cit., 480-490. 
38 Ibid, 489. 
39 Ibid, 495, 507. 
40 Tapper 1973, op cit., 71. 
41 Ibid, 62. 
42 Ibid, 78. 
43 Ibid. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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amir made it clear that it was the job of the Durrani Pushtuns to establish clearly 
that they were the dominant and superior ruling race.
44  
 
Pushtun Kuchis were also quick to take up trading opportunities, encouraged by 
expanding populations and low transit taxes. Groups like the Hazarbuz Kuchis 
became especially prominent in trading along the Silk Route and establishing 
“shops” at key points like Andkhui and Maimana.
45  
 
Entrenchment of Ethnic Tensions over Property: 1901-1978  
The death of Abd al-Rahman in 1901 did not end Pushtun settlement into the 
north.
46 A report of 1907 records at least 11,000 Durrani Pushtun families and 9,200 
non-Durrani Pushtun families in accessible areas.
47 At least 6,000 were in Faryab 
Province.
48 By this time, Pushtun ideas of ethnic superiority were well established, 
“reinforced by government support and by the grant of both formal and informal 
privileges over the other ethnic groups.”
49 British foreign subsidy and weapons also 




Abd al-Rahman’s grandson, the reformist King Amanullah (1919-1929) did attempt 
to limit the worst of the predatory and human rights abuses of one people against 
another in such areas, including bringing allocation of land rights to settlers under 
more scrutiny, but his efforts were not lasting.
51 Uzbeks and Tajiks rose in support 
of the Tajik leader Bacha-i Saqau, who seized the throne in Kabul in 1929 but were 
routed following the restoration of the Durrani monarchy by Nadir Shah.
52 Under 
Nadir Shah’s rule (1931-1933), the Afghanisation policy was firmly revived and then 
sustained by his son, King Zahir Shah, throughout the 1930s and after.
53 Many 
thousands of new Pushtun settlers were encouraged to move to Balkh and Faryab 
Provinces.
54 The improvement of trading conditions from the 1920s further 
stimulated Pushtun Kuchi expansion into the north, where they established 
dominant rights over areas like Dasht-i-Laili. As wealth and social change 




A contributing factor to Pushtun dominance over pastures was the mid-century 
emergence of the concept of “state land.” With each new Constitution and land 
law, the definition of public land became increasingly synonomous with state land 
or government land. Although both the 1965 Land and Statistics Survey Law and the 
1970 Pasture Law described pasture as “public land” only administered by the 
government, this empowered the government to allocate access rights to those of 
                                                 
44 Ibid, 73. 
45 See Frederiksen, B. Caravans and Trade in Afghanistan: The Changing Life of the Nomadic Nazarbuz. Thames and 
Hudson. 1995, 265, and Tapper 1973, op cit., 71. 
46 Nor did the people of Hazarajat to the south see the return of their pastures which had been forcibly taken from 
them in 1884, and who had endured virtual genocide, relocation, imprisonment and enslavement especially during 
the 1890s. Refer to Alden Wily, Land Relations in Bamyan Province, op cit. for details. 
47 Cited by Tapper 1973, op cit., 73. 
48 See Poullada, L. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a 
Tribal Society. Ithaca, New York: Ithaca University Press. 1973; Mousavi, S. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An 
Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political History. Surrey: Curzon Press. 1998; and Roy, O. Islam and Resistance 
in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge Middle East Library. 1986. 
49 Tapper 1973, op cit., 78. 
50 Roy, op cit., 17. The period is most thoroughly covered by Gregorian, op cit., 163ff. 
51 Poullada, op cit.; Dupree 1980, op cit.; Gregorian, op cit., 227ff; Mousavi, op cit., 94. 
52 Tapper 1973, op cit., 79. 
53 Ibid. Roy, op cit. 
54 Roy, op cit.; Dupree 1980, op cit., 188. 
55 Frederiksen, op cit. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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their choice, in practice, to mainly Pushtun Kuchis.
56 Although these entitlements 
were technically use rights only, holders treated these as evidence of their 
exclusive ownership.
57 Grazing taxes had been paid on these lands from the 1930s, 
a fact that became a prime indicator of this tenure.
58 USAID-supported land 
registration during 1965-1974 embedded these rights further, with many near 
pastures being registered as the private lands of leading livestock-owning families, 
including one or two wealthier Uzbek and Arab landlords. Notions of community 
pasture were in the process severely undercut. 
 
The War Years: 1978-1989 
In areas like Faryab where livestock-keeping was as important as cultivation, and 
transhumance traditionally practiced (by early Arab and Uzbek stock owners as 
well as by the later Pushtun maldar), competition for pasture within and among 
ethnic groups increased, with only temporary relief in the dramatic drought of 
1970-72 and the death of up to 80 percent of herds (to be repeated in 1998-
2002).
59 Inter-ethnic tension over land was never far from the surface, and 
although already of long standing, Pushtun claims were contested right up until the 
time of the 1978 revolution and subsequent Russian occupation (1979-1989). This 
was especially so in the districts of Dawlatabad, Shirin Tagab and Gurziwan, where 
settled Pushtun communities were numerous and where Pushtun khans had been 
the recipient of estates previously owned by the amirate of Maimana and related 
Uzbek landlords.  
 
The communist Land Reform of 1978 did not reach deeply into Faryab.
60 Although 
some khans had their arable lands redistributed (such as recorded later in respect 
of Qala-yi Shaikhi Village), this was not lasting. Gurziwan District in Faryab was one 
of the first areas to openly rebel against the government of Taraki and put to death 
numerous teachers and officials.
61 One of the first acts of Tajik and Uzbek 
mujahidin after the arrival of the Russians was not to attack Communist-held 
Maimana but to expel or execute a number of Pushtun khans.
62 Land grievances 
were c or e to  t hes e actions . A s  in many other areas, nomadic Pushtuns (Kuchis) 
were told not to come to the area and semi-sedentary Kuchis living to the east and 
west of the Dasht-i-Laili were forcibly expelled by Tajik and Uzbek mujahidin.
63  
 
C.  Faryab in the 1990s 
 
Resistance to Russian occupation was significant in Faryab and was only partly held 
by Communist and Soviet forces during the 1980s, the front line being at Imam 
Sahib and Pushtun Kot. Formation of mujahidin groups flourished. Mujahidin took 
Shirin Tagab District during the rule of President Najibullah (1986-1992). From 
about that time Faryab was governed by warlords with different and often shifting 
political allegiances. These were primarily but not entirely ethnically aligned. 
Uzbek allegiance was mainly to Junbesh, with General Dostam the most strongly 
emergent Uzbek leader. Contrary Uzbek support for the Tajik Atta Mohammad of 
                                                 
56 Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, op cit. 
57 Frederiksen, op cit. 
58 Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, op cit. 
59 Male, B. Revolutionary Afghanistan A Reappraisal. London & Canberra: Groom Helm. 1982. 
60 Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, op cit.; Roy, op cit. 
61 Personal comm., J.L. Lee. 
62 Ibid and this study. 
63 Ibid. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Jamiat also existed.
64 Many (but not all) Pushtun supported President Najibullah 
before his resignation in April 1992 and then Rabbani (1992-1996).
65 Then those in 
the Dawlatabad/Shirin Tagab area tended to join the notorious Rasul Pahlawan, an 
Uzbek warlord whose base was in the study area, but whose harsh rule and 
influence were to spread over much of Faryab and beyond between 1990-1995. 
 
The impact of Rasul Pahlawan on the lives, livelihoods and land holding of the 
people of Faryab can hardly be over-estimated, the effects of which continue until 
this day. From the returns of forceful exploitation and theft, he built a new capital 
for himself in his home town of Faizabad in Shirin Tagab. He continued the 
decimation of the intelligentsia of Maimana begun by the mujahidin.
66 Exploitation 
gave way to outright persecution, with homes and lands destroyed or occupied at 
will. Although his main adviser was Pushtun and he commanded support from local 
Ghilzai Pushtuns and from those in Balkh and Chimtal, he is remembered by some 
in the study area as being “partial to killing Pushtuns.” Uzbeks also greatly feared 
the abusive behaviour of Rasul and his commanders, with gang-rape and property 
theft rife.
67 Vast sums of money and other assets were accumulated during this 
period. Taxing, tithing and human rights abuse are said to have become the norm, 
affecting virtually every family in the province to one degree or another.
68   
 
Although Rasul was murdered in 1995, Malik, his step-brother (and whose mother 
was Pushtun) stepped into his shoes. Although aligned to Junbesh, Malik fell out 
with Dostam in 1997 and the Taliban felt safe to negotiate with Malik to secure 
safe passage through Faryab.
69 The Talibs reached Shirin Tagab with 4-5,000 men in 
May 1997, the Uzbeks fleeing in their path. Two days later (24 May 1997), just as 
celebrations for “Teachers Day” were getting underway, the Taliban attempted a 
double-cross to remove Malik and he reneged on the agreement and attacked the 
Taliban. It was at this point that Malik is popularly accused today of taking lorry 
loads of Taliban prisoners into the Dasht-i-Laili Desert and shooting them.
70 
Reciprocal massacres of Uzbek by Taliban fighting along the Badghis front took 
place.
71 The Taliban eventually secured Maimana and areas north.
72 People in the 
study area recall that the Talibs “entered with much anger in their hearts” about 
the massacre in the desert and the treachery of their supposed ally, Malik. Local 
Pushtun, some of whom had in fact fought with Malik, now assisted the Taliban.
73 
 
                                                 
64 Especially in Kohistan, Almar and the upper reaches of Gurziwan District. The Jamiat Party has its origins as the 
multi-ethnic Islamiat party under Rabbani. This was combined with Massoud’s Tajik Shura-e-Nizar Party of the 
Panshir Valley to become Jamiat.  Jamiat commands many supporters in Parwan, Mazar and Kabul. Three of its key 
leaders are Defence Minister Fahim, Education Minister Junus Quaoni and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah (the 
former spokesman of General Massoud). Many other Uzbeks in the 1980-1990s were members of the Parcham 
Communist party and fought against the mujahidin. In addition, Faryab had a strong Uzbek nationalist party, some 
of whose members espoused cessession from Afghanistan, led by an exiled Uzbek in Pakistan. See Roy, op cit. 
65 Pushtuns were also divided; some joined Hisb-i Islami of Hekmatyar while others were members of the Khalq 
Communist Party and held positions in Faryab Province and elsewhere during the governments of Taraki, Babrak 
Karmal and Najibullah (1979-1992). See Roy, op cit.  
66 Personal comm., M. Patterson. 
67 Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan. Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pushtuns in Northern 
Afghanistan. April 2002. 14(2c). 
68 Ibid. 
69 It is alleged by officials in Maimana and rural villagers alike that the Taliban paid Malik millions of dollars for 
safe passage. Malik took the money and stood down his army and permitted the Taliban to pass via Faryab. 
70 Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i-Sharif. November 1998. 10(7c). 
71 Ibid. 
72 This took at least three attempts, led by Dostam, once Malik had retreated and fled to Iran. Maimana City was 
one of the main sites of fighting. 
73 Malik is reputed to have commanded considerable support from a range of Pushtun commanders throughout the 
north, including some known to have committed some of the worst abuses of the period (Personal comm., various 
UNAMA staff). Also see Human Rights Watch 1998, op cit. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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The Taliban ruled the north for three years (August 1998-November 2001). As 
general policy they appear to have sought out anyone associated with the Junbesh, 
Jamiat or Wahdat parties, and then targeted non-Pushtun civilians in general. 
Activities that cumulatively suggest a systematic elimination of non-Pushtuns began 
to occur throughout the north and in the associated rebellious area of Hazarajat. 
Massacres began to mount,
74 including the execution of 2,000 mainly Hazara 
civilians in Mazar that shocked the world in August 1998.
75 Dasht-i-Laili once again 
became a graveyard for the murdered, with bodies often left unburied. Many (but 
not all) local Pushtuns supported (and were supported by) the Taliban; some raped 
and pillaged Uzbek villages in vengeance for their own suffering under Rasul and 
Malik.
76 Where Pushtuns had fled in terror several years previously, now Uzbeks 
fled.  
 
Every village in the study area from Shirin Tagab to Maimana was affected. 
Properties again changed hands. Pastures that had been allocated to Pushtuns, 
wrongfully or rightfully, were recouped from 1998 and Uzbek stock owners or 
farmers evicted. Others of uncertain status (such as common lands) were declared 
public land and reallocated to Pushtuns with supporting deeds prepared. These 
actions were complemented by blockades of food, medicine and fuel to Uzbeks, 
mass arrests, hostage-taking, and torching of some Uzbek villages.
77 
 
D.  After the Taliban: 2001-2003 
 
The forces of Junbesh, Jamiat, Wahdat and Harakat combined to defeat the 
Taliban in the last months of 2001. Their fall once again engendered 
recriminations. Irrespective of whether they had supported the Taliban or not, 
Pushtuns fled, mainly to the south, where many still remain. All 30 or so Pushtun 
communities along the Shoor Darya were abandoned in 2001.
78 UNHCR and human 
rights groups began to record the same litany of abuses against Pushtuns that the 
ethnic group previously wrecked upon others.
79  Virtually every one of the many 
villages throughout the province named “Afghaniya” were looted and/or destroyed 
between November 2001 and February 2002.
80 Those who had been sharecropping 
the farms of Pushtuns generally continued to do so while others were directly 




As this short study will illustrate, too little time has yet passed for the fear and 
bitterness between Uzbeks and Pushtuns to have fully diminished. Altogether some 
10,000 Pushtuns fled Faryab in 2001-02 and although returns have been steady 
since, fear and insecurity abounds.
82 Around 5,000 Pushtun households from Faryab 
are still registered as IDPs, with large groups in Kandahar or Herat. Some who have 
attempted to return have been rebuffed, while others have had crops they have 
                                                 
74 Human Rights Watch 1998, op cit. and see Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit., 10-12. 
75 Human Rights Watch 1998, op cit. 
76 Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Tyler, A. for UNHCR. Mission Report: Faryab 26
th November to 3
rd December 2002. Northern Return Commission. 
Maimana: UNHCR. December 2002;  Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit. 
80 Interviewees reported that Rahmat Rais of KSP and Astana of Shirin Tagab and their supporters looted every 
Pushtun home between Faizabad and Juma Bazaar. 
81 In Kohistan, for example, Pushtuns sent a report to UNHCR in 2002 that they feared they would lose all rights to 
the farms even in the long term as Uzbek occupants had begun to cultivate poppy  (UNHCR 2002, op cit.) 
82 Some 7,085 families registered as having returned to their homes by end September 2003 (UNHCR. Property 
Issues in Faryab. Maimana: UNHCR. October 2003). Three local IDP camps (in Dawlatabad, Qaysar and Maimana) 
closed in 2003.  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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collected from tenants stolen on their way to return out of the area.
83 Numbers of 
Arabs and Uzbeks are also absent from their homes. However, their absence is 
difficult to distinguish from widespread out-migration of males to Iran for work.  
 
It is also the case that commanders in the province have taken full advantage of 
the fall of Taliban to since exploit conditions. Without a strong or armed central 
state there has been continuing competition in the north between the Jamiat-i 
Islamic Atta Mohammad and his followers and those of the Junbesh Abdul Rashid 
Dostam, with periodic armed conflict up to the present.
84  P o w e r - s h a r i n g  
agreements have been brokered between the two and by 2003 Junbesh was 
established as the dominant force in Faryab, but with competition among its 
adherents still rife, and the future uncertain.
85 For local people in the study area 
districts, the continued presence of feared commanders with histories of extortion, 
atrocities, forced recruitment, beatings, rape and the keeping of harems of young 
boys, sustain anxiety.
86 Opium production and smuggling now add to these 
concerns. Some of the culprits fill official positions as military commanders under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Defence, adding to the local sense of helplessness. The 
civil administration also lacks the neutrality necessary to command respect. Annex 
B illustrates the complex leadership patterns that existed in Faryab leadership at 
the time of the survey in November 2003. 
 
For its part, the UNAMA office in Maimana has worked tirelessly to mediate 
between Jamiat and Junbesh commanders and to reduce the number of abuses 
described in a stream of petitions submitted over recent years. Warlords have been 
visited and embarrassed into returning wrongfully acquired funds, stock, 
implements and land.
87 During the survey period UNAMA was seen to address 
complaints against commanders in both Shirin Tagab and KSP, the latter involving 
complaints from all ethnic groups against incidents of coerced payment of 
contributions, forced labour on the farms of commanders, forced recruitment and 
theft of donkey loads of straw.
88  
 
Land disputes in which commanders play a prominent role have also been widely 
reported in both these districts, as will be illustrated in the next chapter. 
Nonetheless, NGOs working in these areas consider the situation improved upon 
that of two years past. Armed clashes continue to periodically occur, however, as 
recently as September 2003 in Almar and Pushtun Kot, both of which passed from 
Jihadi to Junbesh control. Complaints to UNAMA are declining but are still many. 
While some concern rapes and murders, others come from returning refugees, 
                                                 
83 Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit.; UNHCR 2002, op cit. 
84 There was, for example, an armed struggle in November 2002 between the Jamiat Beg and Junbesh Shara Beg in 
Sara-yi Qala Village on the border of KSP and Shirin Tagab. Other clashes were reported in Pushtun Kot and Almar 
(UNHCR 2002, op cit.). 
85 In 2003 Faryab Province was declared demilitarised, and a certain number of soldiers relocated into official 
bases on either side of Maimana City, one for Jamiat soldiers and one for Junbesh soldiers, with agreement in 
October 2003 that these be integrated (Mazar Resolution 26 October 2003). Over 2003 the balance of power moved 
to the side of Dostam’s faction, with defections from Jamiat. Hashim Hashim Habibi Khan, an Uzbek commander 
with tenuous loyalties to Dostam, was appointed as Head of the Military Council of Faryab.
 He has had a history of 
changing allegiance; Hashim originally headed up a Najib militia then joined the mujahidin, then sided with 
Junbesh (Dostam), then with Rasul Pahlawan, then with the Taliban and then became a virtually an autonomous 
leader of the south-central parts of Faryab Province.  His human rights record is among the poorest and it is 
alleged that he is involved in opium smuggling into Ghor and is a main beneficiary of income from the salt mines of 
Faryab.   His hold over even other Junbesh commanders is weak, with several key military commanders by-passing 
him and reporting directly to Dostam.  
86 Personal comm., UNAMA, Maimana. 
87 UNAMA Reports 10 November 2003, 15 November 2003. 
88 CHA, as cited in UNAMA Report 10 November 2003 and InterSoS, Pers. Comm. Chris Green. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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It will be evident that property matters as a whole have been deeply central to the 
disturbances of the last 25 years. This paper will now turn to report on the specific 
findings in the review of land relations in 11 villages/hamlets. 
 
 
                                                 
89 Summary of Petitions, UNAMA, November 2003. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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III.   Findings from the Field 
 
A.  Khwaja Musa District 
 
Khwaja Musa District is a new district, carved out from Khwaja Sabz Posh. It is 
administered from Shah Nazar, an original sub-district headquarters. The governor 
at the time of survey (November 2003) was considered effective but suspected of 
royalist tendencies. He has since been dismissed and replaced with a Junbesh-
supporting Uzbek. The district comprises 39 villages, 21 of which are Uzbek (54%), 
seven are Arab (18%), seven are Pushtun (18%) and the rest ethnically mixed (10%). 
Only one mantiqa was visited: the mainly Arab mantiqa of Ortepa. 
 
Mantiqa #1 
Ortepa – An Arab Community 
 
Ortepa comprises a series of related villages that lie along the banks of the 
Maimana River, an eastern tributary of what further north becomes the larger Shor 
Darya River (Saline River). Ortepa was originally administered by Shirin Tagab 
District and is shown as such in official maps. There is general agreement that it 
falls today within the boundaries of Kwaja Musa District. Map 3 shows this location.  
 
Ortepa is one of eight sub-areas or mantiqa that constitute the modern Khwaja 
Musa District. It is bounded on the south by the Uzbek village of Bad Kok, from 
where Uzbek settlement begins. It is bounded on the north by Ata Khan Khwaja, a 
large Pushtun village that is located at the conjunction of the two river tributaries 
that become the Shor Darya. This marks the beginning of the valley referred today 
as Jalaier (or Jalayir), settled since the 1890s by Pushtuns through land grants by 
Abd al-Rahman as described earlier. At that time, one British official described the 
area as vacant; referring to Qaisar/Shur Darya in 1886, he wrote: 
 
“Formerly it was well inhabited and there were large settlements of both 
Arab and Ersari nomads, who grazed their flocks in the chul to the west; 
these though were gradually reduced by (Sariq) Turkoman raids, and in 
1877, the two last Usbeg villages at Ata Khan Khojeh and Jalaiar were 




The defining feature of the Ortepa mantiqa and the glue of its cohesion is 
ethnicity; all permanent residents are Arabs. In addition, there are a number of 
transient workers/sharecroppers of mainly Uzbek descent and some Pushtun IDPs. 
As shown earlier in Table 2, one-fifth of the communities in the three districts 
claim Arab descent. Linkages among these Arab villages are strong, providing 
support and homes to each other during the conflicts of the last two decades. Arab 
villages in Shirin Tagab District are very closely related to the Ortepa Arabs.
91 
These communities claim descent from Arab-Muslim arrivals from Saudi Arabia in 
the 8
th century (2
nd C Hihra). Settlement along the Ortepa valley is said to have 
occurred more recently, when settlers came from Sar-i Pul during the 19
th century. 
Farsi with Uzbeki is spoken, rather than Arabic.  
 
                                                 
90 Yate as cited by Tapper 1973, op cit. 72-73. 
91 The Astana Valley, Arpatu, Dahan-e-Shoor, Farhat, Karkhana and Qala-yi Shaikhi were specifically mentioned. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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The factional allegiance of Ortepa and other Arab communities in the province 
varies; elders claim they have always been caught between Uzbek and Pushtun and 
blamed by both. In this village, the Taliban era was recalled as mainly “quiet,” 
suggesting that they supported or cooperated with the Taliban. Indeed, when the 
Taliban were defeated, many Pushtuns from especially Jalaier further north along 
the Shor Darya fled south to Ortepa, following terrible looting and torture.
92 
Through their Arab hosts, they gained tents and support from UNHCR. While some 
remain in the area, elders say most have returned to their home areas or left 
Faryab altogether. A range of minor local commanders has given way to a single 
recognised Junbesh commander, recently returned from exile in the south, who is 
said to have no weapons and to be respected mainly as an elder in the community. 
Nonetheless, at the time of the visit a security shura was being held. No cases 
where an ex-commander had appropriated private lands were indicated.  
 
The mantiqa comprises between 10 and 15 villages, depending upon how five are 
defined (see Table 5). At least half the villages are made up of mainly landless 
households (9) and serve as satellite communities of the main five landlord 
villages. 
 
Table 5: Villages of Ortepa Mantiqa in Khwaja Musa District 
 












1 Utuz/Ata  Khan 
Khwaja 
2 100 212 0  0  100 
2  Ataullah  3 200 100 0  0  100 
3 Amanullah  (Takhta 
Bazaar) 
2 100 887 3  0  100 
4  Bagha  1 100 134 3  0  100 
5  Sai  1 100 120 2  0  500 
6  Masjid Safid (White 
Mosque) 
2 300 264 8  2  110 
7  Haji  Mohammed  Yar  2 300 263 18  0  600 
8 Haji  Yaqub  1  100  60  0  0  150 
9  Almari  1 200 150 4  1  500 
10 Yaka  Taz 
 
1 100 140 4  0  2,000 
Five hamlets which are not noted in Inter SoS population of livestock data 
 
1 Awaz  Bai  1  100         
2 Haji  Jani  2  200         
3 Nawabad  1  100         
4 Arlan  1  100         











    
Source: This survey and InterSoS. 
 
Each village has its recognised elders and a senior elder serves as a link person with 
the government for the area as a whole (arbab). A community shura was formed in 
2002 with encouragement from the NGO, ACTED. Road improvements and water 
developments are underway. Like all communities along this salty river, potable 
water is chronically scarce. The river valley is wide and flat at this point of the 
tributary and most fields are irrigated by river flooding in spring rather than by 
permanent channels from the river.  
                                                 
92 As described by Human Rights Watch only three of some thirty Pushtun villages in Jalaier and beyond along the 
Shor Darya were occupied in February 2002 (Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit., 29-32).  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Land disputes within the mantiqa are few; the most recent addressed by the elders 
concerned the failure of a returnee to pay the full amount he owed for land he had 
purchased. Although villagers claimed that little land changes hands, a market in 
land is apparent with the value of farmland well-known; one jerib of flood- 
irrigated land costs around $300, channel-irrigated land costs around $600 and 
rain-fed land around $150 per jerib. 
 
Farm ownership 
Landowning in Ortepa mantiqa ranges from majority landless (calculated as up to 
three-quarters of the current population) to those who are said to own up to 100 
jeribs of abi (irrigated land) and 200 jeribs of lalmi (rain-fed farmland). 
Distribution is self-evidently highly skewed. 
 
Pastureland 
With the large numbers of stock still possessed today, pasture is important. A small 
pasture in the southern area of the mantiqa is named Mohammad Shukur (200 
jeribs) and a larger area also to the south is named Tokchi.  Local Arab rights to 
these areas are disputed by Uzbeks in the neighbouring mantiqa to the south, 
following the expansion of Uzbek cultivation into the pasture. The Ortepa Arabs 
lodged a formal complaint in 1996 to the District Officer, but no ruling has been 
forthcoming. Uzbeks have since stopped cultivating the pasture, possibly as they 
themselves have begun to reacquire stock. Currently both areas are shared by Arab 
and Uzbek livestock owners as was the case in the past, and the issue of ownership 
has for the moment been put aside.  
 
A much larger pasture is located directly to the east of the Ortepa villages, 
referred to as Alam Li. Arabs and Pushtuns from the Shirin Tagab River Valley 
villages appear to share this, although Ortepa people claim ownership. By far the 
larger pastures are found in the west, both between the two tributaries of the Shor 
Darya (which does not become one river until further north) and beyond the rivers. 
The latter area is especially vast, extending to the border with Turkmenistan 
(“Chaiqasim”).
93 T h i s  i s  k n o w n  a s  C h a r m g a r  C h a s h m a
94  and is consistently 
acknowledged as public land or government land. Livestock owners from all ethnic 
groups, including nomadic Pushtuns and Arabs from further south in the province 
use this area during spring and summer. Several permanent and seasonal villages 
loosely referred to as Ming Darakht
95 are located in the area, suggesting that some 
amount of cultivation may also be taking place in the pasture. Competition for 
grazing Charmgar Chashma has been historically considerable but less so currently 
due to the reduction in stock as a result of the 1998-2002 drought and the fact that 
many fewer Pushtun nomads are using this public space. 
 
Interviews about household land holding were held in the central trading centre of 
Takhta Bazaar and a small hamlet in the south of the mantiqa, Arlan. The former is 
made up of mainly Uzbek traders and landless Uzbek and Arab households. The 
latter is a hamlet of inter-related Arab landlords, with worker households living in 
neighbouring mantiqa.  
 
Only 14, mostly Arab, landowners were listed in Takhta Bazaar. Shopkeepers 
number at least 30 but claimed they do not own land in the village or mantiqa 
generally. Holdings range from three to 50 jeribs of irrigated land and from five to 
                                                 
93 This may be a version of Khwarazm, the ancient name for what is now Turkmenstan (Personal comm., J.L. Lee). 
94 Meaning “tanners spring” (Personal comm., J.L. Lee). 
95 Meaning “a thousand trees” in Uzbek/Farsi. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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200  jeribs of rain-fed land. Inheritance is the main means of acquisition. It is 
uncommon for heirs to subdivide the farm. All 14 holdings were said to be farmed 
cooperatively among brothers. In the past, tax was paid by the family and the Book 
of Ownership held by the Amlak Department of the Ministry of Agriculture lists the 
farm only under the family name. As typically the case elsewhere in the province, 
the size, grade and owner of farms in Ortepa was registered on the basis of owners 
self-reporting via the village arbab during the 1970s and may be chronically 
inaccurate. When asked if female members of the household are considered 
shareholders in the family holding, interviewees were unable to respond. They 
made the point that women are always looked after in the family and that widows 
live with their children when their husbands die. They could not recall a widow in 
the village who was considered a landowner in her own right or considered the 
head of a landowning household. 
 
The landless 
The landless survive through providing labour on the farms within Takhta Bazaar 
and in neighbouring villages and, in addition, collect dung and brush for winter fuel 
and serve as shepherds. They also work for the shopkeepers. Much of the work is 
undertaken on a daily paid basis. Sharecroppers are considered a more stable 
element of the community, tending to work for the same landowner over some 
years. None are paid more than one-fifth of the crop they plant and harvest, an 
insufficient product to sustain them through the year. “They just have to tolerate 
this” was the response of elders, “There is nothing we can do. One-fifth is the 
rule.”  
 
Landless farmers quite commonly own small stock. Some also own a donkey and 
receive payment for transporting goods. Landowners own camels, oxen, cows and 
up to 100 goats or sheep (Table 6).  Livestock keeping is a major source of survival, 
and residents say Arabs generally keep more livestock than neighbouring Uzbek and 
settled Pushtuns. “Our origins are as nomads; when we first came to Afghanistan, 
we came with livestock and moved around with our animals. We were Kuchis same 
as the Pushtun Kuchis.” 
 
Arlan Village is the smallest village of the mantiqa, located in the far south of the 
territory, directly adjoining the Uzbek village of Bad Kok in the next mantiqa. 
Relations between the two are now peaceful despite the heated quarrel over the 
ownership of the local pastures of Tokchi and Mohammad Shurur mentioned above.  
Arlan’s land area is divided among eight landowning families, as shown in Table 6. 
Two widows live within these families, both of whom were said to have inherited 
their rightful share as laid down by the Koran but who had both promptly handed 
this over to their sons “as is our custom” (note, not to their brothers in this case). 
Three other families are landless but related to landowning families. Each is a 
sharecropper, as their fathers and grandfathers had been before them. They may 
be considered as client households who will remain under the protection of their 
richer relatives. Farm workers and other sharecroppers are Uzbeks from adjacent 

























Tenants Workers    Sharecroppers  Livestock 
1 8  20  Inheritance  Yes;  Farms 
with 2 sons & 2 
brothers 




96 10 Father 
bought rain-
fed 





8 Inheritance  Yes No  No    None  None  None  10  goats 
4 25  20  Inheritance  Yes;  Farms 
with 2 brothers 
No   No   None   None  5 (all Arabs) 
2 live in village,  
3 in close villagers 
1 camel, 1 
donkey, 1 goat 
5  10  5  Inheritance  No; with 1 son 
only 
No No  None  None  None  20  shoats 
6  -  8  Bought 1971  No; with 3 sons  Yes  No  None  None  None  1 donkey 
2 goats 
7  20  40  Inheritance  Yes  No  No  None  None  5 (all Arabs) Live in 
Almari 
1 cow, 2 oxen 
2 donkeys 
20 goats 
8  100  200  Inheritance  Yes  No  No  None  None  10; 2 Uzbek, 8 Arabs. 
3 Live in village 
4 camels, 2 
oxen, 2 cows, 2 
donkeys, 20 
shoats 
8 162  311    Mostly 
inheritance 
Mostly farm as 
one farm.  






                                                 
96 This land is in KSP, near Juma Bazaar, inherited from his father who was born there. He has three quarandar (sharecroppers) who farm for him and receive one-fifth of the crop as payment. 
None of the other eight farmers own land outside Arlan Village, although the land of Akoroheem extends over several adjacent villages. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Off-farm incomes 
More or less, all families have an adult male who has spent time in Iran or is still in 
Iran or Herat. Remittances provide a significant input into survival. The number of 
people who left Ortepa for Iran rose steeply during the drought years. Land sales 
occurred. Currently only two persons in the village have their land under mortgage 
(gerau), a shopkeeper in the bazaar being the mortgagee. Indebtedness to 
shopkeepers by landless households was said to be very high with all “poor” people 
buying food and other goods on credit, usually paying off the debt after some 
months with the sale of sheep. The “very poor” are those with no sheep and little 
income from daily paid work, and these people tend to be refused credit. “We give 
them charity,” explained a shopkeeper. “They come to us when they are starving 
and we cannot refuse them.” 
 
B.  Khwaja Sabz Posh District 
 
Two mantiqa were visited in Khwaja Sabz Posh District (KSP): Qala-yi Shaikhi and 
Afghaniya-Kamozai. These are adjacent and both lie on the northern boundary of 
the district with Shirin Tagab District (and are usually shown on maps as within 
Shirin Tagab). Rasul Pahlawan created KSP as a distinct district in 1987. Its current 
administration is strongly influenced by a well-known local commander, Rahmat 
Rais, who in 2003 was officially absorbed into the military hierarchy as the Chief of 
Staff of Division 200 in Maimana. 
 
KSP is a composite of 24 mantiqa (Table 7). The boundaries of each are known, 
identified by natural features such as rivers, streams, and rocky outcrops. Mantiqa 
typically include settled and farming areas and open pastures. The district 
governor maintains records by mantiqa. 
 
Boundaries among the different village areas that make up the mantiqa are also 
known. Small pastures (alafcha)
97 are often located within village areas, along with 
religious land (waqfi) where mosques and cemeteries are located. Both village and 
mantiqa pastures tend to be controlled by influential landowners in the 
community, some of whom claim personal ownership. Conflicts are common among 
villages and especially among mantiqa in respect to pasture access. 
 
Two-thirds of the villages within the mantiqa of KSP are Uzbek, and over half the 
mantiqa are considered by the authorities to be Uzbek.
98 Turkmen, Moguls, 
Pushtuns and especially Arabs are found within one-third of mantiqa, living within 
discrete villages or at least neighbourhoods of those villages. Qala-yi Shaikhi is the 
most ethnically mixed areas of the district, but is also notable in that it appears to 
have “exiled” the Pushtun village of Kamozai from its sphere. Accordingly, Kamozai 
is treated as a separate mantiqa below. District and local leaders justify this on the 
grounds that Kamozai (or Afghaniya as it is also known by non-Pushtuns) is the only 
village in Qala-yi Shaikhi to be on the western side of the Tagab River, but as 
shown later, the situation is more complex.  
 
 
                                                 
97 Literally “small grasses.” 
98 As so often with demographic data collected during the survey, the figures of villages given by the Governor and 
those collected by InterSoS do not agree; as shown in Table 8, the Governor’s Office claims 66 villages while 
InterSoS lists 102 villages in the District as shown in Table 2. InterSoS did not collect data on mantiqa. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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1 Takht-i-Eshan  Arab  4  1,000 
2 Morchaghal
100 Mongol  (Uzbek)  3  1,000 
3 Sumlik  Pawgan  Uzbek  5  400 
4 Arab  Laghman  Arab  1  90 
5 Pawgan  Laghman  Uzbek  10  510 
6 Qaraqul?  Uzbek,  Tajik  2  100 
7 Sherbaghi  Tajik,  Uzbek  2  300 
8 Shurgul  Tajik  2  110 
9 Khwaja  Qushouri    Uzbek  5  1,303 
10 Fakhal  Toghi  Uzbek  2    170 
11 Katar  Qeshlaq  Uzbek  1  202 
12  Qizil Qeshlaq  Uzbek (Turkman?)  1  200 
13 Ghuzari  Uzbek  1  740 
14 Badghisi  Uzbek  3  600 
15  Deh-I Nau (Juma Bazaar)  Uzbek  2  1,333 
16 Kosa  Qala    Uzbek  1  344 
17 Yangi  Qala  Uzbek  2  523 
18 Taga  Qeshlaq  Uzbek  1  150 
19 Sarayi  Qala  Uzbek  8  1,800 
20 Chuyan  Chaqdeh  Arab  2  120 
21 Bai-yi  Moghuli  Uzbek  1  344 
22 Turkmaniya  Turkmen  1  105 
23 Afghaniya/Kamozai  Pushtun  1  105 




Source: District governor’s office. 
 
Lalmi (rain-fed) cultivation is important and has been steadily expanding in KSP 
over the last 25 years. The distinction between land that is suitable for cultivation 
and pasture is thin, determined as much by use as by agro-ecological 
characteristics. Again, as in Khwaja Musa District, issues of private versus common 
ownership of pasture and common versus public ownership of pasture frequently 
arise. Several tense conflicts currently pertain and garner ethnic colour. One of the 
most important involves Uzbek leaders in Sara-yi Qala and Arab leaders in Qala-yi 
Shaikhi as outlined shortly. The expansion of cultivation is beginning to take its 
toll. Although the chul (loess hills) are famously resistant to erosion, degradation is 
visible. Villagers complain of ever-widening and more rapidly flowing spring floods 
destroying their fields from uncontrolled run-off from the hills. They also 
acknowledge that top soils have been lost on the hills and that the protective 
shrubbery on hills, so important for winter fodder and fuel, has sharply declined. 
Few villagers interviewed in the survey generally connected expanding cultivation 
with these problems (or perhaps preferred not to make the connection), fairly 
obvious to most farmers. 
 
Officials and villagers concur that the majority of villagers in the district are 
landless and often homeless (Box 1). A large number come from outside the 
community and work as contract sharecroppers (gareeb kar). Others eke out a 
                                                 
99 The first five mantiqa are located in the eastern half of the district in the area broadly referred to as the Astana 
Valley. 
100 In the past a substantial wild pistachio forest was found in Morchaghal. Much of this was destroyed during 1978-
1998. The Ministry of Agriculture claims that this was done by local people with the encouragement of 
commanders. The area remains unsafe and Ministry of Agriculture staff do not enter the area. They claim, 
however, to have brought at least the periphery under control, through hiring locally resident forest guards who 
collect the pistachios for the government from local people. The Ministry claims the area as public land, which it 
treats as synonymous with government land. 
101 Only one Pushtun landowner, allegedly the wealthiest man in the district. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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living through seasonal daily paid work; this is popular given current rates of 
around US$2 cash per day, but opportunities are more limited than contract 
sharecropping work. Out-migration for work to Iran occurred prior to 1978 but has 
gathered pace since then for both political and economic reasons. This has usually 
been the privilege of the better-off, those able to meet transport costs and make 
arrangements (leave funds) for their wives and families to be fed in their absence. 
 
Box 1. Rural Classes in Faryab 
 
Kambaghal (beggars/destitutes)  Landless and homeless who survive by begging, including 
many elderly and disabled persons but also some of those 
who are unable to earn enough from daily paid work to 
survive 
 
Mard-i kar/muzdakar (labourer) Landless (and very often homeless) daily paid workers, 
often from outside the area or even district. They spend 
their lives moving from village to village in search of work, 
especially in spring and summer. Typical work includes 
building walls, houses, digging channels. The mean wage 
today is $2 per day, mostly paid in cash; this is proving 
attractive to some better-off landless farmers.  
 
Gharib kar/Charikar                  Landless (and often homeless) who attach themselves to a 
(sharecropper)                          landlord as a sharecropper and are thereby accommodated 
by the landlord. Generally receive one-fifth of the product 
they plant and harvest. Often come from the mantiqa and 
may work for the same landlord for several years. (Note: 
Char yak kar – literally four to one for work). 
 
Baz kar (sharecropper)  Usually a settled member of the community and may have 
his own accommodation. May also own a small plot himself. 
Works as a farmer, often for the same landlord for many 
years. Receives one-fourth of the total crop.  
 
Khistmand (tenant)  Sharecropper who receives up to 50 percent of the crop in 
return for providing all inputs (seed, plough, oxen and 
labour). Usually farms the same plot each year. May own a 
small plot himself. 
 
Nimcha Bai (half landlord)  Middle-sized landowner able to employ a worker or 
sharecropper. 
 
Bai (landlord)  Rich landowner (but may also mean rich merchant). Bai and 
beg are also synonymous terms for important personages. 
 
 
Officials in the district governor’s office said that the recent drought sent hundreds 
of households into destitution. “The very poor were selling their clothing and 
children for food.” Slightly better-off landless lost their small stock, while those 
who owned a small farm or house often sold those assets, or lost them when they 
were unable to pay back loans within the time stipulated for mortgages/pawning 
(generally one to two years).  
 
Unlike Andkhui to the far north and some other parts of the province, KSP District 
is not noted for extremely large land holdings, although a substantial number of 
“large” estates clearly exist and the farming of which is the main task of the 
multitude of landless and sharecroppers. Absentee landlordism is uncommon. The Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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most well-known “khan” is a Pushtun who happens to hold land in Qala-yi Shaikhi, 
variously estimated as running to one thousand hectares of irrigated and flood-
irrigated land. He does not live in the community but in one or other of his 
substantial homes in Maimana or Mazar-i-Sharif. He acquired this land through 




Qala-yi Shaikhi – A Mixed Community 
 
Qala-yi Shaikhi
102 is made up of five villages with a current population of over 1,200 
households (Table 8). This includes a group of 42 so-called refugees living in the 
neighbourhood of Qulghunat who had been displaced from their homes in nearby 
Qulghatoo by an earthquake 20 years ago. They have recently been provided land 
to build shelters by the main landlord Ilbegi family. Around 150 households from 
the mantiqa are absent; the malik listed 483 households as having left the area 
from 1979; 250 went to Iran, 60 to Pakistan and 73 to other provinces. Over 100 
families emigrated to Europe or Canada via Pakistan. Few of this last group are 
expected to return. Many better-off households have sons working in Iran or further 
abroad. 
 
Table 8: Villages of Qala-yi Shaikhi Mantiqa
103 
 












1  Haji Ghulam Sakhi Bai 
 
125  Arab  30 95 76 
2  Haji Baba Sher Aqha  123  Pushtun, 
Tajik, 
Uzbek 
5 (1+4 sons)  118  96 
Ilbegi Qala  Arab  75 












4 Cheshma  Qeshlaq
105 












5  Abdul Wahid (Haji Wakil) 
 
15 Arab  1  14 94 
 
  TOTAL 1,234 
 




Only four households in Qala-yi Shaikhi are substantial landowners. One of these 
includes the extended Arab family of Ilbegi, the core members of which live within 
a vast walled compound referred to as the castle (Ilbegi Qala). A close relative is 
                                                 
102 Meaning the fortress of the sheikhs or religious personages, who could be Saiyyids (i.e., Arabs claiming descent 
from Muhammad), Eshans (religious mystics) or Khwajas (mystics who claim descent also through the female line 
from Muhammad).  
103 Note: these figures derive from interviews in the mantiqa; they do not agree with those collected by InterSoS at 
an earlier date and which identify 1,517 households in four villages only, including the area referred to as 
Qulghunat Refugee Camp, which includes IDPs from a range of other areas. 
104 Meaning “village of the madman.” 
105 Meaning “village on a spring.” Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Haji Ghulam Sakhi Bai, who lives a mile distant with his own village of relatives, 
dependents and workers. 
 
Interviews were held with ten or so male family Ilbegi members, one of whom is 
also acknowledged as the malik or arbab of the area (selected because he has 
education). Their fortified Ilbegi Qala was founded during the 1880s by their 
forefather, Rahim Begi, a wealthy Arab who had been granted land for loyal 
support by King Abd al-Rahman. This may mean that although he was not Pushtun, 
he was a colonist (naqil) given land that was probably owned by one or other of the 
Uzbeki large landowning families, confiscated by Abd al-Rahman from 1884, and 
particularly after 1889 and 1893/94, as integral to the subordination and 
colonisation of Maimana khanate touched upon earlier. His descendants claim he 
created 500 jeribs of irrigated land, now expanded to over 1,500 jeribs (300 ha). 
The household also admits to owning over 4,000 jeribs of rain-fed land (800 ha). 
Others in the village, including their relatives, say their farm is “much larger.” 
 
This land is divided among three main branches of the family, who together 
comprise 42 families with 280 members.
106 One acknowledged owning 300 jeribs of 
irrigated land, farmed by ten tenants and four sharecroppers. All 14 of his farmers 
come from the village but are of different ethnic groups. Not all the Ilbegi family 
members own land; some of the poorer members say they were forced to sell their 
share during the drought or in order to meet taxes, bribes and ushr demanded by 
Taliban leaders. Family members agree that around 200 jeribs of rain-fed land was 
sold for these purposes in 1999-2001. This land was bought by wealthy Uzbek 
relatives of another large land-owning dynasty within the community, the sons of 
Haji Sher Agha. They paid the equivalent of 5,000 new Afghanis ($100) per jerib at 
that time but today could sell the land for 15,000 new Afghanis ($300).  
 
Irrigated land has meanwhile been purchased by some of the wealthier farmers 
from departing Pushtuns in neighbouring Afghaniya-Kamozai. (Kamozai are a sub-
tribe of Pushtuns). This occurred in late 2001 to early 2002. Prices in the range of 
10,000 new Afghanis ($200) were paid, contrasting sharply with the value of their 
own land, which Ilbegi family members said would never be sold today for less than 




Ilbegi Qala: a village of mixed land ownership 
In total, over 90 percent of households in the mantiqa are landless (Table 9). The 
largest group lives within the central village of Ilbegi Qala. Around 800 of these 
families are dependent upon the Ilbegi household to one degree or another; only 
half their number are hired to farm their land. The remainder depend in turn upon 
those workers or leave the village in search of off-farm daily paid work or farm 
work with other landlords.  
 
A group interview was held with 30 landless men who live within Ilbegi Qala village. 
All were Arabs, all born in the village but not necessarily related to the Ilbegi 
family. Twenty-two of the 30 worked on Ilbegi land, three worked for another 
landlord within the area and the remainder had been working outside the mantiqa 
or had no work other than occasional off-farm daily paid work. Eight of the 22 
Ilbegi workers were khistmand  (tenants), providing more than their labour and 
received between half and in rare cases, three-quarters of the crop as payment. 
                                                 
106 Haji Raouf, the most direct descendant of Rahim, comprises five families with 80 members. Haji Ayab’s branch 
comprises 15 families with 100 persons. Haji Hussain comprises 22 families with 110 persons. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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The remaining 14 farmers were providing only their labour (baz gar). Only one had 
worked for the same Ilbegi for more than a decade (in fact for 30 years). The rest 
said they usually stayed with the same landlord for one or two years only. To stay 
longer, was to encourage exploitation: “They start to expect voluntary work from 
you, to take advantage.”  
 
Only six of the 30 landless men interviewed owned their own house; the remainder 
lived with relatives, also mainly landless sharecroppers. Thirteen of the 30 men 
(44%) had been at least once in Iran since 1999. 
 
“Everyone who was able, left for Iran or Pakistan during the drought; those 
who stayed had to eat grasses. Some managed to do some daily work for 
the landowners who have large irrigated lands and could still cultivate 
even without the rain.” 
 
Three-quarters had visited Kabul, Herat, Mazar or other cities in Afghanistan at 
least once during this period. The remainder had worked elsewhere in the district 
or province, sometimes only going as far as Juma Bazaar, the capital of the 
district. In sum, not a single of the 30 men had not worked (or attempted to work) 
outside the village. For most of them, farming was also not the only source of 
survival, the trend being to supplement spring and summer farm work with daily 
paid work, contracts (or even begging) elsewhere. 
 
“When the crop share runs out we have no choice but to go and offer 
ourselves to landlords or townspeople for jobs, any job that can earn 
money. We fix up walls, make bricks, carry loads, make things for them or 
become shepherds. We are paid 100 new Afs every day but the work never 
lasts long.” 
 
The one-fifth crop share varies with the area cultivated by the farmer but is said to 
average around 300 kg of wheat and barley, 100 melons and 8kg of sesame seed. 
All but the wheat is sold if at all possible, yielding a total income of around 3,300 
new Afghanis (US$66).  It is common for farmers to have to borrow from relatives 
or shopkeepers up to the same amount of wheat again to feed themselves and their 
families. 
 
For most, conditions over the last decade had deteriorated. One told: 
 
“For ten years I was a kistmand, getting three-quarters of the crop then 
with the drought I had to sell my oxen and was reduced to just one-fifth. 
This last season I could not even get work as a farmer. I fed my family with 
loans from shopkeepers.” 
 
Debt 
The shopkeeper confirmed mass indebtedness. He did not know a single landless 
person in the village community who did not owe him money. No landowners owed 
him money. The shopkeeper claimed no choice but to let people have food on 
credit, usually wheat, for their crop-share runs out after five months. As he 
charges no official interest he covers his costs (and more) by charging high prices 
(and possibly charges compound interest behind the scenes). Since the drought he 
has imposed no time limit for repayment “as people always try to pay me 
whenever they can” (in order to keep their credit line good). Many collect and sell 
dry fodder from the hills to repay at least something on the debt.  
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The shopkeeper also noted that whereas prior to the drought, even the very 
poorest owned some small stock “as was our custom,” numbers of sheep and goats 
had dropped dramatically. Among the 30 farmers interviewed, ten had owned 
sheep in the past (“sometimes 200 animals”), but only three owned animals today 
(respectively 5, 20 and 50 sheep). Those who had lost all of their sheep were 





This group of landless farmers were mixed in their view as to their status. Some 
felt that landlords have become less generous and are reserving what work they 
have for relatives. Others said, for example: 
 
“We have good relations with the landowners. In the old days, the verbal 
agreement was that you must spend all day and all night the whole year 
working. This has gone now and the landlord knows now that he cannot 
force you. But even in the old days we were forced to go farmer to farmer 
to find work like we do today.” 
 
Farmers recalled a brief period of respite in 1978-1979: 
 
“During Taraki’s time the government took some thousands of jeribs from 
the three largest khans here (Ilbegi, Haji Ghulam Sakhi Bai and Haji Sher 
Agha Baba) and made a government farm. We were employed; we had no 
choice, we had to work for the government. It was made a cooperative. It 
was a good time as we were paid around what would be today 100 new 
Afghanis ($2) every day, the same as you can earn today for daily paid 
work. It worked well for two years before the revolution collapsed and the 
landlords took back the land.” 
 
There was agreement that the divide between landowners and landless is difficult 
to bridge. 
 
“People can buy animals but not land. Land is for the landlords.”  
 
“Land has always been owned by just one or two people and there has 
never been land for us to farm. Even the pasture is owned by landlords.” 
 
“The only land rule is that those with land and those without land will 
always be so.”  
 
“The difference between a landowner and a landless person is very simple. 
It is like owning a car; either you have a car or you don’t have a car. It 
changes the way you are, what you can do and how people look at you. The 
behaviour is different.”  
 
Most wrath was reserved for commanders/warlords and those landlords who 
supported them. 
  
“Our fathers had a better time than we. There was security and peace and 
lots of animals. We have no control over our lives today. We can be forced 
                                                 
107 Current prices (November 2003) in KSP: Goat: 2,500-3,000 Afs; Sheep: 3,500 Afs; Oxen: 20-30,000 Afs; Donkey: 
5-10,000 Afs and Camel: 25-30,000 Afs. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       30 
anywhere at any time. The big landlords support the commanders so we 
have no one to turn to.” 
 
“We are tired of being bullied and forced. We want a law that favours us 
and peaceful conditions. Local commanders just come and make us work 
two days here, two days there, for themselves. Even last month I was going 
along on my donkey and I was stopped and made to work the whole day for 
the commander.”  
 
Cheshma Qeshlaq: a satellite village 
Another hamlet in Qala-yi Shaikhi was visited. All 13 households of Cheshma 
Qeshlaq are landless. Eleven are Uzbek and live together in a single compound with 
one large shared sleeping room, a kitchen, store, yard and adjacent mosque. The 
land and accommodation is owned by the Ilbegi family, to one of whom they pay a 
small rent. Two Pushtun households live apart in their own quarters, under similar 
arrangements. Unlike the landless of Ilbegi Qala, these farmers are not native to 
the mantiqa (Table 9). None had ever owned land, and neither their fathers nor 
grandfathers had owned land. Like them, the current farmers have spent their 
working lives moving area to area in search of farm work. Only two own houses in 
their home areas but fear these will have collapsed through lack of repair (theft of 
poles in particular), as they have no one to look after those houses.  
 



























1 6  Astana 
Valley 




2 6  Astana 
Valley 
X 4  0  3  donkeys   
2 cows 
Yes Shopkeeper 
3 5  Astana 
Valley 
X  6  0  1 donkey  
1 cow 
Yes Shopkeeper 
4  8  Shirin Tagab  X  3  0  1 cow  Yes  Shopkeeper 
5  6  Shirin Tagab  X  4  0  3 cows 
1 donkey 
Yes Shopkeeper 
6  5  Shirin Tagab  X  4  0  1 cow 
2 donkeys 
Yes Shopkeeper 
7 5  Astana 
Valley 
X 3  0  1  cow Yes  Shopkeeper 
 
8 7  Maimana X  2  0  2  cows  Yes  Shopkeeper 
 




10 2  Sarayi  Qala  X  5  0  3  cows 
1 donkey 
Yes Shopkeeper 
11 2  Astana 
Valley 





* All but one has only worked within the Province and one third only within the district. 
 
 
Although these workers claim they do not like to stay with one landlord for more 
than a year or two, most had been in Cheshma Qeshlaq for five years, some of 
them with the same landlord.  
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Each year a new arrangement is made with the landlord; these are verbal 
contracts, made in September/October for the coming year, and include the right 
to reside in the accommodation for the winter. At the time of interview, the 
farmers suspected they might be evicted, as it was November and they had not 
been told that they would be hired again. In this event, most said they will try to 
go to Iran and find work. Three held IDP cards which have helped with getting 
food, even though they are not IDPs; movement out of their home villages is the 
norm, not induced by strife.
108  
 
All 11 farmers were in debt and had lost their livestock during the drought. This 
included a surprising number of cows, considered their prime asset. They did not 
believe they would have the means to re-purchase oxen or milk cows. Their wives 
do not work for landlords, do not embroider or make gilims, as they have no skills 
for this nor the means to purchase wool, dyes or looms. The farmers showed 
limited interest in becoming landowners themselves, saying that a landless person 
could never become a landowner. They shared a single main aspiration to own their 
own housing. This seemed achievable to them over the long term. They spoke 
enviously of their predecessors, a group of Turkmen who had occupied their 
current accommodation; these families had enjoyed an unusually good run of years 
from growing cotton prior to the drought and had been able to move into Juma 
Bazaar, the district centre, and set up small trading enterprises. They believed 
that some of them now owned rooms of their own. 
 
Without plough oxen, their share from farming is much less than it had been in the 
past. Today it lasts around half the year. Like the landless in neighbouring Ilbegi 
Qala Village, they borrow from the shopkeeper in preference to landlords, although 
they would not state exactly why.  
 
Changing land use and conflict 
Like other locations in the province, rain-fed farming (lalmi) in the area of Qala-yi 
Shaikhi has greatly expanded since 1979. Traditionally, lalmi was undertaken only 
in the floodplains and on gentle slopes near villages. The arbab was unusual among 
villagers in clearly linking farm expansion into pasture areas with soil degradation 
and floods. He pointed out the line to where cultivation had been originally 
permitted and complained that it was now reaching the top of hills, whereas 
previously cultivation was deliberately limited to the lower third of hillsides. 
Expansion was causing degradation and limiting the area for stock. 
 
“The floods are getting worse and destroying our farms in the valley. The 
soils fall down the hills and the area is useless after several seasons. Even 
the stock owners suffer, for no grasses grow. The bushes get rooted up. 
When people cultivate the hills we lose the hills and the valley lalmi as the 
big floods wash our fields away with the soil. Arabs who own a lot of stock 
are against the hills being cultivated. Uzbeks are the ones extending 
cultivation. The extension began when we began to sell land to Uzbeks.” 
 
In the past (pre-1978) the government had limited expansion of cultivation, 
although villagers were unclear exactly why. Since 1978, and particularly since the 
1990s, a free-for-all situation appears to have existed. It was evident that the 
arbab did not have the authority to halt the expansion, but mainly because the 
Uzbeks referred to were not members of his ward (Qala-yi Shaikhi mantiqa) but 
from the neighbouring ward of Sara-yi Qala. 
                                                 
108 Both a UNHCR and NGO official in Maimana admitted that they are not aware of the tradition of mobility and do 
tend to assume that someone not from his home area is an IDP.This is especially so currently if they are Pushtun.  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Although the chul hills to the east of the settled part of the village are used for 
grazing, these were not identified as common land, but the private lands of the 
handful of landlords in the area. A landless villager observed: 
 
“The hills are owned land and have always been owned in our lifetime. Our 
fathers and forefathers used to identify their land not just by cultivation 
but by the wider area; from this hill to this. There is no chance to have 
common land that we can all use because of this; all the land is owned. 
The only land we can access is pasture beyond the lalmi. But even this is 
not owned by us but by the landlords. They have to let us use their 
pasture. That is the way it has always been.” 
 
Expansion of cultivation now extends well beyond the village edge into the deeper 
chul. A series of small settlements have been established an hour’s walk from Qala-
yi Shaikhi.
109 It is this area known as “Kalta Shor” that has come under heated 
dispute with leaders of the neighbouring mantiqa of Sara-yi Qala.  
 
The conflict has taken on ethnic dimensions between Arab and Uzbek. In addition, 
commanders of non-Junbesh and Junbesh are respectively supporting their people. 
Shah Mohammed, an Arab of Qala-yi Shaikhi who is said to have had links with the 
Taliban, is identified as the commander on the Arab Qala-yi Shaikhi side. An Uzbek 
descendant of Sharab Beg supports Sara-yi Qala landlords. He gains direct support 
from the Junbesh Governor, Chief of Police and Commander of KSP in Juma Bazaar, 
and who in turn are supported by Rahmat Rais, the (Junbesh) Head of Division 200 
in Maimana, who comes from the area. 
 
For his part, Shah Mohammed is a member of the Ilbegi clan and like all Ilbegi 
claim that Kata Shor was public land (“government land”) and that under King 
Amanullah (1920s), the Ilbegi were given the right to use it as pasture. They claim 
to have paid tax on the land up until 1978 and say this proves that the government 
accepted their ownership. When pressed as to the nature of this ownership, they 
could not distinguish between ownership of the pasture or ownership of rights to 
use the pasture (access rights). They said this was the same thing. The Ilbegi arbab 
said that the Taliban had endorsed their ownership, and that documents existed to 
this effect. However, some Qala-yi Shaikhi villagers believe the Ilbegi bribed 
Taliban officials to provide this endorsement.  
 
Several years past, the Uzbek families of the neighbouring Sara-yi Qala mantiqa 
took their claim to the court, which ruled in their favour. Whereas documents held 
by Ilbegi describe the area as Shor-i Qala-yi Shaikhi (the saltpan of Qala-yi Shaikhi), 
the new documents name this area Shor-i Alaqa-yi Maimana (the saltplan of 
Maimana).
110 The Ilbegi dismiss the documentation, claiming that Uzbek courts will 
always support Uzbek claims. They have no faith in the government either and 
point to the fact that the governor of the district, from Sara-yi Qala, is an Uzbek 
and would never rule in their favour. 
 
Much of the Kata Shor pasture is now cultivated. Relatives of the Arabs in Qala-yi 
Shaikhi have established summer shelters in the pastures to guard against further 
expansion. They were recently ordered to leave the area by the district 
commander but have resisted. 
 
                                                 
109 Arab settlers from Arkatoo and Takhto-i-Shan were specifically named. 
110 Alaqa being another term for mantiqa. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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“We will fight for this pasture even until we are killed. We have no choice. 
We cannot rely on the government. There is no government to rely upon. 
Even if Karzai himself came here he could do nothing to the commanders. 
They have the guns and the power over everyone. Hashim Habibi supports 
Mohammed Gul Takla, the District Governor, and the Deputy of the 
Military Junbesh is Rahmid Rais and he is also from Sara-yi Qala. We have 
no hope of getting anything which the Junbesh Uzbeks do not want.”  
 
Mantiqa #3 
Kamozai – A Pushtun Community 
 
Kamozai (also referred to as Afghaniya, as are most Pushtun villages in Faryab 
Province) comprises a large Pushtun settlement on the main road along the Tagab 
Valley, with a smaller sister Pushtun hamlet half a mile to the south. Today both 
villages are entirely destroyed. Other than one visibly able-bodied farmer, those 
who live today in the ruins are the very poor, elderly or ill. They refused to give 
information and urged our immediate departure.  
 
“Until we have complete disarmament we have nothing to say because we 
would be killed if we told you anything or complained. Even now it will be 
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  y o u  h a v e  c o m e  h e r e  t o  t a l k  t o  u s .  E v e n  t h e  c e n t r a l  
government can’t control the warlords. Every time Karzai promotes a 
Pushtun we fear the worst, for the Uzbeks hate Pushtuns and will attack 
us.” 
 
Below is presented the story of Kamozai as far as could be gleaned from the one 
able-bodied farmer and people living across the river in Qala-yi Shaikhi. Kamozai is 
not one of the original Pushtun colony settlements. The village was first 
constructed during King Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973). Its founders were 15 
related Durrani Pushtuns from the Kandahar area, possibly a whole clan. 
 
“Our fathers brought hundreds of animals. They did not come because the 
government sent them but because they were desperate for new grazing 
land. They did not plan to return to Kandahar but to settle here. They 
bought all this side of the river from the wealthy Uzbek on the other side 
of the river, Sayed Rahman Agha, the grandfather of Haji Agha today.” 
 
These founders had been nomads; they did not have or keep homes back in 
Kandahar; their plan was to settle. They claim to hold bills of sales testifying to the 
purchase of the land, bought with cash from livestock sales. Although they built 
houses and cultivated, their primary objective was to raise livestock and these 
were taken annually westwards into the dry deserts of Shor Darya extending up to 
the Turkmenistan border (Charmgar Chashma).  
 
Up until the 1990s Afghaniya was considered part of Qala-yi Shaikhi and comprised 
350 households. Some left the area for Herat and Iran after the Russian invasion, 
(“fearing they would lose their sons to the fighting”). Those who remained looked 
after the lands and livestock of the others. No property was stolen during the 
Russian period. Uzbek sharecroppers continued to farm the land. Problems began 
with the rise of mujahidin, the hated time of Rasul Pahlawan and his half-brother, 
Malik (1990-1998) and with the rise of local Junbesh commanders in the area who 
supported them. As early as 1986 these commanders looted the village and killed 
some Pushtuns. Such attacks continued through the 1990s. The Junbesh Sharaf Beg 
from neighbouring Sara-yi Qala is specifically cited as the lead perpetrator. Most of Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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the residents fled, leaving their lands and homes in the charge of poorer Pushtuns 
or tenants.  
 
They returned with the Taliban occupation and retrieved their lands. After the fall 
of the Taliban in late 2001, the Kamozai Pushtun escaped again en masse, first to 
the Shor Darya Desert in the west, then to Herat and elsewhere. Today the 
descendants of five of the 15 landowning families live in Kandahar, five in Herat 
and three in Pakistan. Some will not return. 
 
As they feared, their houses and stock were looted between December 2001 and 
February 2002, with not a single wooden beam or window or door frame remaining. 
Both Arabs from Qala-yi Shaikhi and especially Uzbeks from Sara-yi Qala are 
blamed. More deaths among the poor who remained occurred. The farms they had 
left were taken over by Uzbeks. But as had been the case during Rasul and Malik’s 
time, these sharecroppers do not appear to have claimed these lands as their own, 
or at least do not do so now. Many are the same tenants that worked for these 
Pushtuns before, very poor Uzbeks. Others are new workers. Because of the 
disadvantaged situation of the Pushtuns, they are able to claim a higher share for 
their work, one-fourth rather than one-fifth of the crops. They have, however, lost 
access to their pasture. One of the poor in the abandoned village observed that 
even if the Pushtun landlords return, they will not be allowed to take their 
livestock to the desert: “This is now Uzbek and Arab territory.” 
 
Two Pushtun elders from the community returned from Kandahar in August 2002 to 
collect shares from their expansive farms but were allegedly robbed by Rahmat 
Rais when they attempted to transport 21 tonnes of wheat.
111 During 2003 a 
handful of poorer persons returned, and Uzbeks from Sara-yi Qala are reported to 
have provided them with some beams to help them rebuild their houses, suggesting 
a degree of reconciliation.
112  
 
However, an Arab in neighbouring Qala-yi Shaikhi observed: 
 
“The Pushtuns will not return to Kamozai for so long as Taliban are alive 
and fighting for power. They are too afraid. We blame the Taliban for our 
troubles and Uzbeks especially hate the Pushtuns because the Taliban are 
Pushtun. Many Pushtuns supported the Taliban. They led the Taliban to our 
houses to take guns and property. If the Taliban get power again in this 




“In the old days Kamozai used to be part of this mantiqa. Since the 
troubles no one wants those Pushtuns back and their villages will never be 
part of our community.” 
 
As noted earlier, the district authorities concur with this distinction, listing 
Kamozayi as a separate community. 
 
                                                 
111 UNHCR 2002, op cit. 
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C. Shirin  Tagab  District 
 
Shirin Tagab District comprises 12 mantiqa o v e r a l l ,  w i t h  8 7  v i l l a g e s  a n d  a n  
estimated population of over 16,000 people (see Table 1).
113  Interviews were held 
in four villages in three mantiqa of Shirin Tagab District: Islam Qala, Turk al-Baluch 
and Gurzad. In particular within the first village the interrelationship between 
warlordism, ethnic hatred and land tenure problems was sharply apparent, and a 
constantly volunteered subject of conversation. This no doubt stems from the fact 
that the district headquarters, Faizabad, was the headquarters of one of the most 
feared warlords in the north, Rasul Pahlawan and his half-brother Malik, whose 
legacy is still most felt. 
 
The current governor, who left the area in the early 1990s (to Iran) along with 
many other officials who were persecuted by Rasul,
114 had this to say: “Rasul was a 
dictator. He made himself king, chief of court, chief of police and mullah – 
everything. All our problems in this province stem from Rasul.” Malik, to whom 
Rasul’s mantle passed on his death in 1995, was widely recorded by the survey to 
have permitted the same exploitation and brutality of his half-brother, including 
the theft of farms, pasture and water mills. Although half-Pushtun himself and 
gathering significant support from local Pushtuns, those Pushtuns who supported 
other parties than the one to which Rasul or Malik at the time adhered (mainly 
Junbesh) found themselves at the receiving end of the routine extortion, abuse and 
land theft. During his several years of rule (1995-1998) villagers allege that 
hundreds of Pushtuns were killed in the district. A commonly cited event was the 
massacre of more than 120 Pushtuns in the Jalaier Valley to the north of Ortepa, 
whose bodies have been recently recovered from wells (2003).  
 
Pushtun retribution upon Shirin Tagab Uzbeks when they returned under the 
security and support of Taliban rule (1998-2001) was fierce. Uzbek homes, farms 
and livestock in the district were looted, much as their own had previously been. 
As outlined shortly in the case of Islam Qala, both the association of the area as 
the home area of the hated Pahlawans and the location of most Shirin Tagab 
villages along the main road to the north made Taliban-supported retribution all 
the more forceful. This was a fate, however, which some Uzbeks from the district 
in turn revisited upon the Pushtuns, as they fled after the fall of Taliban, 
attempting to take as many livestock as they could with them 
(November/December 2001).  
 
An alleged lead actor in the expropriation of Pushtun farms and livestock during 
2001-02 was the Junbeshi warlord, Hashim Astana, now the formally recognised 
commander of the Ministry of Defence post in the headquarters of the district 
(Faizabad). In theory, he is confined to this post and permitted only five armed 
bodyguards. In practice, villagers say he has some 20 armed men at the post and 
can call up many hundreds of armed supporters, especially from his home area, the 
Astana Valley in the east of the district. As head of Junbesh in Faryab and the 
Chairman of the Provincial Military Council, Hashim Habibi has cautioned Astana for 
inciting ethnic hatred and extortion,
115 but is himself considered a dangerous 
torturer and exploiter by many residents of the province (Annex B). Astana in turn 
                                                 
113 The remaining mantiqa may be named Gurzinam Qeshlaq, Tapa Qala, Koh-i-Sayed, Faizabad, Shashtepa, 
Rahmad Abad, Jar Qala and Astana (Personal comm., Governor Khal Nazar). 
114 Many of these men were forced to flee to Iran or Mazar during the time of Rasul Pahlawan who persecuted them 
mercilessly, mainly because of their loyalty to Dostam. Many of them tell stories of Rasul executing their relatives, 
stealing their women and looting their homes (Personal comm., J.L. Lee). 
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allegedly despises Hashim Habibi for siding with Pushtuns. He avoids reporting to 
General Dostam through Hashim Habibi.
116 In contrast, while both the governor and 
chief of police are also Uzbek and Junbesh supporters, it is said that they are 
antagonistic to Astana. Other officials comment thus: 
 
“No one is safe from Astana. We hear complaints that he still fines people 
ushr and zakat and is very harsh to Pushtuns who have returned to the 
district. Many come and live next to this office so they will be protected.”  
 
“Astana’s continued presence in this district is a worry to us. At the 
moment this district is peaceful, but we fear that trouble will begin again. 
We have begged the military authorities to to ask Dostam to remove Astana 
from our area.” 
 
“Our worry is also about his half-brother, Malik. Although he now lives in 
Kabul he is powerful and has taken land in this district which he refused to 
return.” 
 
And a villager near Faizabad:  
 
“Astana is a thief. He bribes. He steals. He is like a wolf, taking in the 
night what he wants. Pushtuns in Shor Darya and Shah-i Suf fear him, fear 
him coming. He is a devil (shaitan).” 
 
While a survey such as this is in no position to adjudge the reliability of these 
accusations, one fact remains clear: warlords or commanders, past or present, are 
deeply disliked and feared, even by those people of their own ethnicity. In 
addition, an important instrument of their power is their ability to steal land and 
livestock, for themselves or their followers. 
 
Land disputes 
Not surprisingly, land disputes are common in the district. Most have ethnic 
dimensions. Some concern private arable land. A typical minor case concerns a 10 
jerib vineyard in Koh-i Saiyed Village that was sold by Pushtuns to Uzbeks in 1996 
but reclaimed on their return during the Taliban period. They said they have been 
forced to sell the land for a minor sum. On the fall of the Taliban, the evicted 
Uzbeks reoccupied the land. Both parties have lodged their claims in court, 
although the Pushtun family considers the court biased towards Uzbeks and does 
not hope for a positive outcome.  
 
A more significant case concerns Bish Gul, a 500 jerib rain-fed cultivation area 
within Shah-i Suf pasture, west of Faizabad. The area belonged originally to Faiz 
Bai, a very large Uzbek landowner. He and three of his sons were murdered by 
Rasul Pahlawan after forcing Faiz Bai to sign over the land to him. Remaining sons 
fled to Iran. Rasul sold their land for high sums to 30 different people and caused 
the court to issue false documents of ownership. The sons have returned to live in 
the bazaar at Faizabad to await the return of the land. The 30 current owners are 
unwilling to surrender the land, having paid for it, and are using the evidence of 
their title deeds signed off by the head of the district court. That judge is still in 
place. The files have now moved to the provincial court in Maimana but the local 
judge has the support of that court. The district governor said: 
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“To tell you the truth our problem is that the court signed the title deeds, 
and the same judge is still here. How can he now say what he signed was 
not true? He refused to deny any wrongdoing.” 
 
Pastureland at the centre of conflict 
Similar to the previous two survey districts of Khwaja Musa and KSP, ownership and 
control over local pasture land is a matter of widespread dispute in Shirin Tagab 
District. Pasture divides into spheres considered public land, common land and 
private land. The lines between each are poorly defined. An exception is the vast 
Charmgar Chashma to the west of the Shor Darya River, agreed by all to be public 
land. What is meant by public land is, however, also ill-defined. The Pasture Law 
of 1970 implies public ownership, with the government as merely administrator and 
issuer of access rights over these estates. Government officials, including those of 
the current administration, tend to perceive “public land” and “government land” 
to be one and the same. Nor do they pay much attention to local common land, 
lumping all pasture into the one class of “public/government land.” 
 
A more nuanced approach to these definitions is provided at the local level. In 
Shirin Tagab, the current governor (effectively a self-appointed official) 
acknowledges distinctions between private, common and public pastures. Villagers 
interviewed concurred. Private pastures are generally closer to villages and are 
considered by local notables to be included within their estates. Those large 
landlords who own pasture generally consolidated their personal title to these 
lands in registration exercises during the 1970s, on the basis of paying tax for those 
lands.
117 It is not always clear whether these payees are claiming to own the land 
or claim only the exclusive right to use the land. Even those pastures acknowledged 
locally as common lands are under dispute, both among communities and between 
leading families. Named major pastures include: Takht-i Eshan, “Arpatoo” and 
Shah-i Suf, all to the east of the Tagab Valley, and generally grazed today by Arab 
owners. Pushtuns are said to have traditionally grazed to the west, at “Shulooktu” 
and beyond the Shor Darya River into Charmgar Chashma. Large private pastures 
are located within the Turk Al-Baluch mantiqa and perhaps others not identified by 
this short survey.  
 
The vast Dasht-i-Laili desert, the southwest quadrant of which falls within Shirin 
Tagab District, is hotly disputed public pasture. For much of the last century, this 
desert has been an important seasonal pasture for people in the north, including 
the many Kuchis who were resettled into or migrated to the area from the 1890s 
and especially from the 1920s. Pushtuns on the whole consider the Dasht-i-Laili 
their domain, public land which has been earmarked for their use. There has been 
an uneven history of periodic minor cultivation in especially the perimeter areas of 
the desert. Formal cultivation of the area was in fact begun by the government 
itself during the 1980s, the Ministry of Agriculture bringing some 3,000 jeribs in the 
west under rain-fed cultivation, for its own income generation. This area was 
appropriated by Rasul Pahlawan for himself and his relatives. Allegedly he forced 
some 1,500 people to go and work there. “Some died of thirst.”
118  
 
Commander Hashim Astana has been among those who are said to have followed up 
this appropriation by expanding cultivation further. One villager described the 
commander’s personal holdings in the Dasht-i-Laili as so large that “even his ten 
tractors are unable to complete the ploughing.” A review by FAO in 2003 showed 
that 24,000 jeribs had been ploughed on the Shirin Tagab side alone (and another 
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54,000 jeribs on the Shibarghan side of the desert).
119 Pushtuns from Chahr Asiya 
(four mills) in the Astana Valley who claim this land as their pasture are allegedly 
also among those cultivating, or at least sending workers to cultivate, and 
receiving one-fifth of the crop as rent. Meanwhile all customary and official 
controls over the use of the vast desert have fallen away. A number of writers have 
made reference to these over time.
120 These include strategies to limit or spread 
stock numbers, arrangements for watering and closure of vehicle routes at certain 
times — but most of all, limitation upon cultivation in pastureland, a provision 
lodged in law since the 1965 Statistics and Land Survey Law, and entrenched in the 
Pasture Law of 1970. The government itself has not adhered to this, no doubt on 
the grounds of another article in that law permits government projects to be 
exempt from such restrictions. 
 
Mantiqa #4 
Islam Qala – An Uzbek Community 
 
Islam Qala is one of the larger mantiqa in Shirin Tagab District and comprises 13 
villages, all of which are Uzbek save one (Table 10). These lie along the main road 
from Maimana to Andkhui. Each village of Islam Qala has a representative, 
appointed by the male elders. They do not form a mantiqa shura, although a local 
NGO has formed a women’s shura. 
  
The mantiqa is bounded on the north by Tash Qala and Gurziwan Qeshlaq, on the 
south by “Gurzad” and by pasture to the east and west. Relations are close with 
Uzbek communities to the west, some families owning land in Atta Khana Khoja 
and other villages along the Maimana-Shor Darya Rivers.  
 
Table 10: Villages of Islam Qala Mantiqa 
 











1 Kul  tepa  1  100  84  Uzbek 
2 Bed  Qeshlaq  1  300  250  Uzbek 
3  Kata Qeshlaq (Islam Qala)  11  500  350  Uzbek 
4 ‘Ishpalta’  1  50  50  Uzbek 
5 ‘Saqek’  Qeshlaq  1  120  100  Uzbek 
6 Nowabad  1  75  60  Uzbek 
7 Baghat  1  150  150  Uzbek 
8 Kohna  Bazaar  1  50  *  Uzbek 
9 ‘Gurralama’  1  120  45  Uzbek 
10 Khanaqa  1  200+  150  Uzbek 
11 Yangi  Qala  Khurd  1  70+  Uzbek 
12 Yangi  Qala  Kalan  1  120 
220 
Uzbek 
13 Khoja  Charkhi 
 
1 12  20  Pushtun 
  TOTAL 23  1,867  1,479 
 
 
* Included in Yangi Qala 
 
Kata Qeshlaq 
Kata Qeshlaq (also known as Islam Qala) is said to be an old settlement of many 
hundreds of years, strategically placed along the main spine of the Shirin Tagab 
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Valley. Uzbeks claim that their forefathers arrived in the area with the first wave 
of Uzbek settlement around 1500 AD. Pushtun settlement (Khoja Charkhi Village) 
occurred in the 1890s. Unlike the community of Qala-yi Shaikhi further south, the 
Uzbeks of Islam Qala acknowledged this village as within their mantiqa even though 
it too is on the other side of the river. 
 
The area is densely populated, farm size said to be low and pasture limited. 
Interviews were held in the main roadside village of Kata Qeshlaq and the Pushtun 
village of Khoja Charkhi. No large landowners were identified in the former village. 
Most who own land in Islam Qala have one to five jeribs of irrigated or flood-fed 
land and five to ten jeribs of rain-fed land. The majority of villagers own no land at 
all.  
 
A principal complaint of the people of Kata Qeshlaq is the worrying loss of more 
and more irrigated and flood-fed farmland over recent decades. Elders estimate 
that over 3,000 jeribs of prime land has been lost to floods in the last ten years. 
Flooding in the Tagab Valley is normal and people depend upon the flood to 
irrigate the fields. However, this last decade floods are reputed to have been 
particularly fierce, breaking the walls of fields and carrying away the soil. Many 
fields were still flooded late into the 2003 summer and had remained unplanted. 
The elders suggested “changing weather” as the cause, but one did ponder 
whether expansion of farming in the hills from where streams feed the floods might 
be a factor. 
 
Meanwhile, the area available for grazing is also decreasing as farmers expand 
cultivation into areas traditionally reserved for pasture. All local pastures had 
disappeared since Rasul’s time, save one large and very dry pasture some 
kilometres to the west, adjoining the Shor Darya pasture of the Pushtun of Jalaier 
Valley. This 2,000 jerib pasture, named “Itaqotan,” was claimed as belonging 
solely to the Uzbeks of Islama Qala, but “we let those Pushtuns on the other side of 
the pasture (Jalaier Valley) use a part.” People from their own local Pushtun 
village of Khoja Charkhi do not attempt to cross the Tagab River with their stock to 
reach Itaqotan, but travel in the opposite direction to Shah-i Suf in the east. This 
pasture marks the southern edge of the Dasht-i-Laili and is one of the areas subject 
to conflict since recent Uzbek cultivation of the area. 
 
Like so many in Afghanistan, the elders of Islam Qala were vociferous as to the dire 
effects of the recent drought which began to be most felt in the area in 2000. 
Livestock numbers plummeted (Table 11). Taliban taxes and oppression were 
considered contributory. Many were made destitute and “the poor have not yet 
recovered.” Numbers of landless and homeless rose, along with begging. Among a 
group of women interviewed,
121 one told how her father had been a small 
landowner but the mujahidin fined him for passively supporting the Najibullah 
government and he had been forced to sell his land to pay the fine. In retaliation 
he took up arms and left, but returned only to find drought. From then until this 
time he has owned no land, no house and cannot get sharecropping work. Every 
now and again he earns 100 Afghanis doing daily paid work. It was also said by this 
group of women that some farmers sold their daughters before they sold their land. 
Mortgaging was not favoured during this time, as sellers wanted to maximise the 
                                                 
121 An interesting feature of Islam Qala was the number of women who participated in interviews and their 
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returns. The elders reported that only one person in the mantiqa who had sold land 
has since been able to buy it back. 
 
Table 11: Livestock Past and Present in Islama Qala Mantiqa 
 





















1 Kul  tepa  14  6  50  2  500  50 
2 Bid  Qeshlaq  190  6  260  2  3000  100 
3  Kata Qeshlaq/Islam Qala  160  5  300  10  5000  500 
4 “Ishpalta”  60  4  40  0  900  100 
5 “Saqhech”  Qeshlaq  60  4  100  5  1000  20 
6 Nowabad  30  4  30  1  100  7 
7 Baghat  50  6  150  5  300  200 
8 “Gurralama”  16  2  30  2  200  0 
9 Khanaqa  30  4  60  5  200  0 
10 Kohna  Bazaar 
11 Yangi  Qala  Khurd 













13 Khoja  Charkhi 
 





Female property rights 
Widows are today numerous in the village of Kata Qeshlaq and most are bad off, 
forced to live on the charity of relatives. Elders calculated that widows number 
around 500 in the 13 villages. Death from fighting had been a main cause of 
widowhood (although two cases where men had fallen off donkeys were cited). 
Widows themselves noted that life was difficult and “widows do their best to 
remarry quickly in order to gain a man’s protection and food.”  Widows of poor 
families had predictably fared worse, described by the elders themselves as 
“destitute” and “difficult to assist;” they have no homes, their children have no 
homes and there is never enough food.  
 
Neither elders nor widows could recall an Uzbek woman in the community who 
owned land or who had inherited land. Women do inherit, they said, but pass this 
land immediately to their sons as usually it is just a small share of land.  
 
The situation among the slightly wealthier group of Tajiks in the village was 
different. Several Tajik women do own land, acquired through inheritance. Their 
brothers or husbands farm this land for them and the income goes into the 
household pot. One Tajik woman interviewed had received a share of land along 
with her two sisters some 20 years ago, as her father had no sons. She had never 
actually seen the land (it is rain-fed land some distance away). Her husband 
arranges for a sharecropper to cultivate it. Her two sisters also married and their 
husbands manage their share of land for them. One has died and her land remained 
with the husband; it was not passed on to her daughters. The woman knew two 
other Tajik women in the neighbourhood who owned land. A Tajik male said that 
he farmed the garden of his grandmother, which she had inherited from her 
husband. As farmer, he receives one-fifth of the grapes. He said this was 
insufficient return for the work involved, but accepted this as it was for his 
grandmother. He farms his own land as well and in addition runs a small business. 
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Land and the Taliban 
The Uzbeks of Kata Qeshlaq typically wanted to speak of their recent history and in 
describing this presented a picture of fear and loss during the late 1990s that 
mirrors that subsequently experienced by local Pushtuns. The main evacuation of 
Uzbeks from the area had been ahead of the Taliban, with further out migration 
during the drought. Departures had occurred previously but on a lesser scale. The 
entry of Taliban into the area had been dramatic. Word reached the roadside 
community that the Taliban were arriving and panic ensued, with people departing 
without clothes or food for a week. Villagers fled to the north (Andkhui) and east 
(Shibarghan, Mazar) as they feared to go west because of Pushtun habitation along 
the Shor Darya (Jalaier Valley) and recognition that they would not be permitted to 
pass into Turkmenistan. The Taliban established a base camp in Islam Qala with 
around 150 soldiers.
123 Within a week or so, many villagers had to return because 
they were starving in the hills. They recall with bitterness how they found many 
homes destroyed and many animals taken.  
 
However, among the women interviewed, comments were more sanguine. One 
woman observed that she had been surprised at the same time to see how much 
was actually left intact, including some animals.  
 
“It is wrong to say that the Taliban took everything. They did not. But they 
did take a lot. They did not occupy our houses either. They did not take 
the land although some Pushtuns made Uzbeks sell them their land.” 
 
Another woman noted: 
 
“In fact, we looted each other. After they looted us when the Taliban came 
then later, when the Taliban left, we looted the Pushtun homes on the 
other side of the river in Khoja Charkhi. We took everything we could find, 
doors, windows, poles and anything left in the houses. We were 
disappointed; they had not left much and had taken all their animals. They 
had been making preparations as they knew the Taliban would not survive 
the bombing of the Americans, so they sold as much as they could. There 
was not much for us to take.” 
 
Not all Uzbeks returned to the village in late 2001 and many are still absent. 
Landless households in particular have often not come back: “They have no homes 
here. Perhaps they are working now in other villages.” For those who were present 
during the Taliban rule, life was difficult. From time to time there were brutal 
beatings and mortality.
124 The Taliban did not try to recruit anyone in the village. 
They considered Uzbeks the enemy and potential soldiers against them. Young men 
who did not leave the area were periodically rounded up and sent to gaol in Herat. 
There was only one local commander in the area and he attempted without success 
to rouse resistance against the terrorised community.
125 He eventually left for Iran 
where he still is a labourer. He would not ally with Astana, a stronger Uzbek 
warlord and now powerful in the area, and had no arms of his own. Uzbeks were 
subject to intensive taxing, especially prior to the drought. Local Pushtuns tended 
to support them. 
                                                 
123 There were also posts to the north and south in, respectively, Faizabad and Juma Bazaar. 
124 One woman said: “You can imagine during the night, look at the moon, look at the hill and you would have seen 
on the ridge many of the men taken there and beaten and beaten. Some of the old ones died. We think around 40 
people from this mantiqa died at the hand of the Taliban.” 
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“When the Taliban arrived, the Pushtuns who lived here were just ordinary 
poor people like us, but they were given weapons and began being cruel. 
Some stayed just working their lands but some were very bad and joined 
the Taliban wholeheartedly.”
126  
D.  The Pushtun Village of Khoja Charkhi 
 
With such events in the very recent past, it is not surprising that the Pushtun 
villagers of Khoja Charkhi demonstrate the same nervousness and fear encountered 
further south in Kamozai Afghaniya. Khoja Charkhi lies on the eastern side of the 
Tagab River, a mile from the nearest sister villages of Islam Qala mantiqa. The 
village has its origins in a land grant made to colonists in the 1880s. The grantees 
were Noorkhel Kuchis from Kandahar and received assistance from Abd al-Rahman. 
A sister community of Kuchis was established at the same time, located half a mile 
south but falling within the neighbouring mantiqa of “Gurzad.” In both cases, the 
Pushtuns were given land that they insist was vacant but which the Uzbeks claim 
was their property. The settlement lies directly alongside the river and has 
significant channel-irrigated farmland. 
 
Human Rights Watch describes the arrival of Hashim Habibi, the Uzbek commander 
currently in charge of Faryab (November 2003).
127 He arrived with soldiers and 
proceeded to loot and abuse the residents, most of whom left. Prior to this time, 
around 40 Pushtun families lived in the village.
128 Those that have since returned to 
the village protest their innocence:   
 
“We were not Talibs but the Uzbeks always assumed just because we were 
Pushtun that we must be Talibs.  We rushed away when the Taliban left 
the area; we were afraid we would all be killed. We only left because we 
wanted to save our lives and to prevent our women from being raped. 
When we returned the Uzbeks were farming our land and had taken 
everything. But they did not keep the land. Most have let us farm our land 
again.”  
 
For their part Uzbeks in the area say they know precisely who supported the 
Taliban and those ones will never return as they fear for their lives. Their land is 
being farmed by others as described below. 
 
Sixteen of 40 households listed by residents have not returned (40%). All 16 have 
retrieved their farms and houses and re-established relations with previous Uzbek 
labour, albeit on different grounds. Returnees acknowledged that “many” of the 
households who have not returned fear to do so because of their involvement with 
the Taliban. Today these displaced persons live in Maimana, Herat or Iran and two 
in Gurziwan District.  
 
At first, the villages said that the land of these absentee villagers was abandoned 
but later it transpired that around half have tenants farming their land, supervised 
by those who have returned. Most of the tenant sharecroppers are Uzbeks from the 
                                                 
126 One Pushtun from Khoja Charkhi is particularly singled out. “This was Abd al-Raouf Mullah who led the beatings 
and attacks. When the Taliban lost he escaped to Pakistan although someone said he is now a shopkeeper in Herat. 
He could never return here given the things he did here.” 
127 Human Rights Watch 2002, op cit., 34-35. 
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other villages of Islam Qala mantiqa across the river. A few are Tajiks. There is 
also a handful of poor Pushtuns sent back to the village to cultivate. The returnee 
Pushtuns complained bitterly of having to pay Uzbek tenants more than half the 
cropshare (four-fifths) against the normal half share when farmers provide all 
inputs (seeds, ploughing, labour). Where the land is irrigated, the tenant keeps 
only three-fifths of the crop, even though irrigation management is added to his 
tasks. Both are higher rates than normal; Uzbek sharecroppers are clearly taking 
advantage of Pushtun vulnerability. It would be difficult, however, to accord these 
improved shares yet at the level of a fair return for the farmer. 
 
The villagers made a repeated point that Pushtuns in this village always owned land 
(“the Noorkhel was always a landowning clan”). The suggestion was that their 
forefathers were cultivators in the south before they immigrated into Faryab with 
Abd al-Rahman’s help. Once they arrived, local Uzbeks were drawn in to provide 
labour and have done so ever since. Pushtuns themselves in the area rarely involve 
themselves directly with farming any more than Uzbek landlords.  
 
Table 12 provides a slightly less rosy picture of land ownership, with only 83 
percent owning rain-fed fields and two-thirds owning irrigated land by the river. 
Three own no land at all. However, one is a 10-year-old boy whose father has died 
and some claim he will inherit land soon, held currently by his uncle. A second is 
elderly; it was not clear who has his land now or whether he has abandoned it. A 
third household owns substantial land in the Jalaier Valley (Shor Darya). The heads 
of household of four families are in Iran and these families hire tenant 
sharecroppers along with most of the other landowners. 
 
Pushtun IDPs 
Additionally, the village has 14 guest families from other Pushtun villages. They are 
registered IDPs. They fear to return to their own villages, again likely because of 
their involvement in abuses during the Taliban time. Some acknowledged having 
tenants of their land in their absence, from whom they managed this year (2003) to 
collect their due share. Eight of the 14 are from Faizabad, not far to the north. 
Two are from Shah-i Suf, a pasture area to the east. They were livestock owners 
with only small farms in the pasture. They lost most of their stock in the drought. 
They hope to return to the pasture when the Uzbeks allow them. Four displaced 
families are from Darzab, near Shibarghan. 
 
One of the IDPs is a mullah from Faizabad. He listed 20 extended families who left 
their homes in the district capital in 2001 and have still not returned. Four are in 
Khoja Charkhi as above, 12 are in Shahr-i Nau (the new town built to the south of 
the old town by Rasul Pahlawan and which is today the governor’s centre in 
Faizabad), two are in Iran but their families are in Nau Shahr, one is in Kunduz and 
one is in the Jalaier Valley (Shor Darya). All those in Nau Shahr and in Khoja 
Charkhi employ sharecroppers to tend their farms on the much-complained about 
four-fifths arrangement. 
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Table 12: Current Occupants of Khoja Charkhi Village 
 

















1  Yes Yes Large  Family  No  No 
2  Yes  No    Large  Family  No  No 
3 Yes  No  Large  Abandoned  No  No 
4  Yes  No No -  No  No 
5  Yes No  Yes Uzbek  sharecroppers  No  No 
6  Yes Yes Yes Uzbek  sharecroppers  No  No 
7  Yes  No No Livestock  only,  old    No  No 
8  Yes Yes Yes Family  Yes  No 
9  Yes Yes Yes Family  No  No 
10  Yes Yes    Yes Family  No  No 
11 Yes  No  Small  Family  Yes  No 
12  Yes Yes Yes Hires  sharecroppers 
4/5. He is in Iran, 
family here 
No No 
13  Yes Yes Yes Family 
 
No No 
14  Yes Yes No  Old,  hires 
sharecropper 
No No 
15 Yes  Small  Small  Sharecropper  No  No 
16 Yes  Small  Small  Family  No    No 
17 Yes  Small  Small  Family  No    No 
18  Yes Yes Yes Iran  but  family  here; 
hires 2 sharecroppers 
4/5 
No No 
19  Yes  Small   Small  Iran, family here. 
Hires 1 sharecropper 
4/5 
No No 
20  Yes Yes Yes Sharecropper  No    No 
21  Yes  No No Farm  in  Shor  Darya  No  No 






No Yes  2  sharecroppers  No    No 





Turkul Baluch – A Peri-Urban Uzbek Community 
 
This  mantiqa comprises just two villages on the edge of Faizabad, the district 
headquarters. Almost everyone is Uzbek. Villagers who were interviewed did not 
know the total number of households but spoke of thousands. This is confirmed by 
data collected by InterSoS which suggest two unusually large peri-urban 
communities: Baluch numbering 6,000 households and Turkul 1,200 households.  
 
Land holdings are small, with interviewees asserting that “almost everyone” is 
landless. This was borne out in the survey; less than one percent of the 1,200 
households in Turkul were identified as khans (large owners) and their farms were 
considerably smaller than those encountered elsewhere; these averaged only two 
hectares of irrigated and flood-fed land (10.3 jeribs) and less than eight hectares 
of rain-fed land (39 jeribs). Two of these landowners did not in fact own any rain-Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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fed land. Irrigated and flood-fed land ranged from 2-40 jeribs (0.5-8 ha) and rain-
fed fields from 10-100 jeribs (2-20 ha).  
 
Interviewees could not recall any women, widows or otherwise, who owned land in 
their own right. They believed that cases of this must exist but that their sons were 
farming on their behalf. Nor could the villagers identify any women who owned 
livestock, although again they observed that there was no rule against women 
owning stock, especially milk cows. Prior to the drought a much greater proportion 
of households owned livestock and Baluch was noted for its very large herds. As 
everywhere, stock losses were significant (Table 13). 
 























Turkul  1,200 200  30  900 
 
20 500  70 
Baluch  6,000 20,000  160  10,000 
 


















Source: InterSoS 2003 
 
Pastureland 
In both villages the status of pasture was a matter of concern to interviewees. All 
ten pastures described as used by villagers are on the eastern side of the Tagab 
River and extend some two hours’ walk towards the Dasht-i-Laili. One of these is 
Shah-i Suf, but unfortunately which one was not clarified. Most of the pastures 
adjoin each other. Table 14 provides a summary of their status. It will be seen that 
disputes are rife. Six of the ten are subject to conflicting Pushtun and Uzbek 
claims. Internal dispute also rages among those wishing to see the pastures 
retained for that purpose and those who are desperate for new land. Usually these 
are not the traditional landless but those who had land but were forced to sell it 
due to the drought or who have lost part of their farms as a consequence of recent 
excessive flooding and erosion. They also sold their stock during the drought so 
their need for pasture is currently less. Larger owners, those who managed to hold 
onto substantial herds, are expectedly the most keen to protect the pastures. The 
very poor, those who neither own land nor stock, do not seem to be part of the 
disputes. In principle, however, most support the expansion of farming into 
pastures. These reasons are given: first, the more land farmed, the more labour 
work available; second, the pastures belong to Uzbeks anyway, not Pushtun, and 
Uzbeks should be able to use them. One villager contradicted these views saying 
that poor people do not want the pastures cultivated, as the rich will claim these 
lands as their private land. “The pasture belongs to everyone, not just the big 
farmers.”  In all cases, it will be evident that the expansion of cultivation into 
pastures has served as the catalyst for dispute. 
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STATUS OF CULTIVATION 
 
1 Lihab  Privately  owned  by 
a Baluch landlord. 
Used by Baluch 
villagers. 
Yes; both by villagers 
claiming it as de facto 
common property and by 
Pushtuns claiming as 
within their wider area. 
Yes; 400 jeribs and 





of Baluch village.  
No None 
3  Parm bala  Originally private, 





Yes; internal conflict. 
Taken to the governor, 
not solved. 
Yes; 120 jeribs by 3 
households. The source of 
dispute. 
4 Hikordengan  Turkul-Baluch 
common property 
(whole mantiqa) 
Yes; claimed by Pushtuns. 
Also disputed by local 
people although 
cultivators recognised as 
needy because lost land 
to floods. 
Yes; 10 Turkul near-
landless households 
cultivate post-drought 
although some cultivation 
pre-drought also.  
 
5 Barra  Turkul  common 
property 
Yes; Pushtuns claim as 
their land. 
Yes 
Only one person from 
Turco cultivating.   





No  Only one farmer has 





Yes; claimed by Pushtuns.  Minor cultivation by 






No  Yes; Half cultivated, but 
mainly before drought, 
“long time ago.” 
 
9 Arabzayi  Remote,  near 
Astana area. 
Yes; Pushtuns claim. 
Indications that could be 
public land as claims are 
for shared use, not just 
Turkul-Baluch mantiqa. 
 
Yes; Pushtuns began to 
cultivate during Taliban. 
Uzbek also now 
cultivating. 
10  Qojat  Beyond Arabzayi.   Yes; Pushtuns have 
submitted claim to the 
governor following Uzbek 
cultivation. 
 
Yes; 800 jeribs and 





130 provides an example of the issues. This is claimed as a private 
pasture, owned today by the four sons of a deceased very large landowner of 
Baluch Village. These men apparently flourish a title deed as evidence of their 
tenure when challenged. Since the drought and decline in their herds, the sons 
have begun cultivating this area for melons and wheat (400 jeribs), retaining the 
remainder for grazing their stock. Others from the village may also graze this land.  
 
The discussion around the pasture’s ownership was indicative of the nuances 
contained in constructs of private ownership, routinely perceived at the same time 
as a local common good. That is, those who dispute the right of the Yuldash sons to 
convert the pasture into farmland acknowledge that they own the area but in 
terms that suggest trusteeship.  
                                                 
129 These names were phonetically recorded and will not accord with Dari spelling. 
130 Also referred to as Lailab and Lilibab. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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“Lihab belongs to that family but they can’t use it without our needs in 
mind. We have always had the right to graze there.”  
 
“The pasture only belongs to the large landlord of our village because all 
land has to be owned by someone.”  
 
Notions of local common property are heavily implied in these perceptions. The 
implication is that the Yuldash dynasty acquired the land not only on their own 
behalf only, but also on behalf of those who may depend upon them as relatives, 
tenants and workers. In this construction, Yuldash was not pasture owner in his 
personal capacity but as head of a community. Registration of his ownership was 
titular, as head of community, used now to entrench personal claim. 
 
Meanwhile, one part of the Lihab pasture is claimed by Pushtuns, who occupy an 
adjacent area. Baluch villagers say that they are newcomers, moving from Shah-i 
Suf following the drought and the loss of their stock. Villagers claim that Pushtuns 
received legal documents for the land only recently, during the time of Rasul 
Pahlawan (1990s) “because he was easily bribed and the Pushtuns are wealthy.”  
 
Mantiqa #6 
Gurzad – An Uzbek Community 
 
Gurzad is located in the far south of Shirin Tagab District. It comprises three 
villages, a main village and two satellite communities of different ethnicity. Tepa 
Lalajan (or Afghaniya) is largely deserted, the Pushtuns again said to be still fearful 
of returning. Many of their houses were destroyed during the December 2001-
February 2002 post-Taliban backlash. 
 



















Gurzad  Uzbek & 
Arab 




Pushtun 10-50 40 2  50 0  500 50 
Beland Dasht  Turkmen  
 
50 No  data 
Source: This survey and InterSoS for livestock data 
 
This is a poor mantiqa like Turkul Baluch. Interviewees claim that no more than 10 
percent of households own their own land. Many landless do, however, own their 
own homes, with heads of households frequently out-migrating to work in Iran (and 
less frequently, Pakistan) for periods that range from three to 24 months. Some 
adult males said they had been going to and from Iran since the 1970s and 
continued to do so throughout the conflict years. One noted: 
 
“Some come back and see there is no work here and go back the next year. 
Some never return. It is too expensive to come back and forward and some 
marry in Iran. There are some wives here who have not seen their husbands 
for ten years even though they get money sent to them. It is easy for 
people in Iran to arrange money to be sent. There are people in Juma Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Bazaar and Faizabad who are reliable agents (mohalla); the family always 
gets the money.” 
 
Ten of 30 landless householders interviewed had not worked as contracted farmers 
during the last season but as daily paid workers, sometimes doing farm work but 
mainly carrying out wall and house building and repairs. For this they received the 
current standard wage of 100 Afghanis per day, paid at the end of each day. 
Unskilled and generally younger men looked after livestock for a lesser fee. 
 
Returns from sharecropping 
Most of the farmers work as sharecroppers. Few own oxen and had received the 
standard one-fifth of the product as payment at the end of the 2002/03 season. 
They worked for landowners only six days a week and said that conditions are 
better today than had been the case for their fathers. Shares are typically 
measured by a tightly-woven sieve (paimana), with the sharecropper receiving one 
sieve for every four sieves measured out for the owner. The process is undertaken 
by both parties.  
 
In Gurzad each sharecropper plants an average of one sack of wheat and/or barley 
seed (estimated as around 10 Maimana sir or 145 kgs).
131 Yield in a very good year 
such as 2003 may provide a six-fold return (870 kg). The sharecropper receives one- 
fifth of this grain (174 kg). This had a market value in late 2003 of 18,000 Afghanis 
(US$360). The wheat is not sold but consumed, and normally lasts four to seven 
months depending upon the size of the family. Thereafter wheat must be 
purchased, usually on account from one of the several local shopkeepers. In 
addition, the sharecropper receives an average of one paimana of sesame seeds (50 
kg) and between 100-150 watermelons. These are sold in Juma Bazaar for a total of 
less than 2,000 Afghanis or US$40.  
 
Farmers in Gurzad prefer growing maize and millet to barley but without seed of 




Three among 30 landless householders interviewed had owned land in 1999 but lost 
it during the drought. One had described how hunger forced him to sell his five 
jeribs of irrigated land (1 ha) as well as his water mill. He had received the 
equivalent of 100,000 Afghanis (US$200) for the land in 2001 but believed it would 
cost him five times that amount to repurchase the same land today, two years 
later. The land had been bought by a “doctor” in the village (an unqualified 
dispenser with a shop selling drugs). As the shopkeeper has hired others to work 
the land, the seller and his son now work as sharecroppers for other farmers. The 
two other farmers had sold smaller farms to landowners, one of whom also owns a 
shop in the village. They and their sons survive on erratic daily paid work. They 
regretted they had not become sharecroppers, but at the time were uncertain that 
the 2003 season would not fail as the three before it and leave them still hungry 
and in even more debt. Daily paid work seemed a safer bet. 
 
All farmers interviewed knew of others who had lost land over the last decade. One 
included a widow who had inherited land from her father. This was taken from her 
by her brothers during the 1990s. They estimated that there were between five 
and ten other widows in the community who owned a share in the family land.  
                                                 
131 Each sack of wheat seed in 2003 was 15,000 Afghanis ($300). Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Land disputes 
Gurzad is uncomfortably placed close to Juma Bazaar, a frequent site of fighting 
over the last decade. Villagers have seen more than their fair share of looting, 
extortion and taxing. Major incidents were cited during Najibullah’s regime (1986-
1992), the Pahlawan period (1990-1998) and the Taliban era (1998-2001). 
Commanders in all instances had led the destruction. More routine fines and 
excessive taxation were also common during the 1990s (Rasul Pahlawan). Land 
theft also occurred. Several disputes arising from these are pending; one concerns 
mortgaged land, which the lender claims he bought outright.  
 
Others mainly involve Pushtun land in the village of Tepa Lalajan. One involves a 
12 jerib vineyard and associated rain-fed fields in Shor Darya. The brothers of the 
original owner, who have returned to the village, claim their brother was forced to 
sell the land to the powerful Guli Pahlawan (a brother or half-brother of Rasul and 
Malik Pahlawan),
132 who is indeed accused in many villages of extorting money and 
land illegally. They took the case to court. Another villager suggested that it could 
be just a case of the brothers of the sellers now wanting the land back. For his 
part, the governor of Shirin Tagab, no friend of the Pahlawans, was emphatic that 
the title deed held by Rasul Pahlawan’s uncle was “illegally prepared.” He said he 
had ordered the restoration of the lands to the Pushtun family but that Guli 
Pahlawan was still contesting the case and making it impossible for the family to 
re-enter either lands.  
 
Water rights and management 
As everywhere up and down the Tagab Valley, water is sometimes scarce and its 
management problematic, with floods and the constant need to renew channels. 
Water is said to be owned by everyone, although only landowners control its 
access. In general, the larger the land the farmer owns, the greater his influence in 
establishing the system for sharing water. The Gurzad mirab (water manager), who 
has been managing water sharing for 40 years, could not recall a single dispute that 
lasted more than a day: “I manage the water so there are no disputes.” Those 
around him testified to his success. One noted that this is not always the case, with 
frustrated people blaming mirabs for water shortages that they cannot control. The 
mirab said his job involved opening and closing the ten water points he controls 
several times a day, including at night. All three villages in the mantiqa are served. 
He does this work with the help of villagers; a crier is sent to call for assistance. He 
has neither time nor need to farm himself, receiving two paimana of wheat from 
each sack of grain produced (20 kg) from families who benefit from the canals. 
 
Rain-fed land in the immediate vicinity of the village is scarce and those with 
means have typically used such lands to the west towards the Shor Darya River. 
Melons are mainly planted there from late March (Hamal). They admit this land has 
also been traditionally used by Arabs from especially the Ortepa mantiqa but that 
they have no current disputes with them. They claimed that boundaries of fields 
are well known and respected. “The Arabs always return to their village as settled 
people. They do not try to claim the lalmi as their living place like many Pushtuns 
are now doing.” 
 
                                                 
132 During Malik Pahlawan’s time (1996-1998) Guli served as Provincial Military Commander and gained a notorious 
reputation for extortion. He is currently serving in Mazar-i-Sharif, appointed by Minister Fahim, and the owner of 
many businesses and buildings there.  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Common pasture 
The pasture owned and used by Gurzad people is one hour’s walk to the east and 
known as “Parhad.” This falls within the area generally known as “Astana.” It was 
agreed among interviewees that this pasture is the common property of all village 
members, irrespective of whether they own stock or not. There is no committee to 
manage the pasture. Agreements as to movement, shepherding and watering are 
made by interested families annually. Animals are taken to the pasture in the very 
early spring (Hoot, beginning March 21
st) and returned to the village in Saratan 
(from June 21
st to July 20
th).  Larger herds remain longer, usually under the 
supervision of sons.  
 
There is no cultivation on the pasture – as yet. During President Daoud’s time 
(1973-1978) several hundred Arab Kuchi families from Kohistan began to arrive in 
the area annually for the period March to April. They would return to Kohistan for 
May through August and then return again briefly to Parhard on their way westward 
to the public land beyond the Shor Darya River (Charmgar Chashma) and remain 
there until March. One of the leading Kuchi Arabs claims to have a title deed, 
issued during King Zahir Shah’s time, a not unlikely claim. Up until 2003, the 
Gurzad and Arab herders managed to share the pasture without open conflict. In 
2003, when Gurzad people attempted to cultivate some of the pasture they were 
forcibly prevented from doing so by the Kuchi Arabs. Their leader claimed to hold a 
deed for the area, issued by King Zahir Shah’s government, a not unlikely claim. 
The issue of ownership will likely be reactivated as soon as the Kuchi Arabs return 
to the pasture this year (2004). “The matter has not been resolved. We still want 
to cultivate that area, as it is our land.” 
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IV.  The Widows of Faryab 
 
One of the other purposes of this survey was to obtain a snapshot of the property 
rights of urban widows. This arose from recognition of the high proportion of 
widows in the 11 villages visited, following years of fighting, stress and 
impoverishment, and the wistful opinion of one village widower that every widow 
would move to town if they could, as life in the village was so oppressive for them. 
The proportion of widows is not unusual; some agencies estimate that there could 
be up to two million widows in Afghanistan today but it is more likely around the 
one million mark.
133  Government officials in Maimana estimate that there are 
around 30,000 widows in Faryab Province. Some 5,000 widows have been formally 
registered in Maimana City alone.  
 
Houses 
Everywhere the lives of these widows are considered difficult. Access to shelter 
especially concerns them. Village elders and arbabs claimed to do their best for 
widows, but the women interviewed spoke bitterly of their poverty and of 
discrimination against them. Loss of the earning male household head typically 
plunges poorer widows into destitution, as it was only through their husbands’ 
employment as a farm worker that they had shelter. They generally try to move 
into the homes of relatives or try to remarry to secure shelter and food for 
themselves and their children. 
 
Farms 
Inheritance of property by widows is expectedly complicated. Many interviewees, 
both male and female, acknowledged the dictates of the Koran (see Box 2). The 
Civil Law, prepared in the mid-1970s and supposedly used by courts,
134 is as clear 
on the property rights of widows. However, its many articles do not present a clear 
picture as to the required division of shares (refer to Box 3). Villagers obviously do 
not have access to their laws. Customary practice generally overrides both Shari’a 
law (or what is understood locally as Shari’a) and civil law.  
 
It will be recalled that cases of female inheritance were recorded, particularly 
among Tajik women, a minority in the districts visited. No instances of widows 
inheriting land or houses were recorded in the Arab and Pushtun communities and 
in two villages it was indicated that this was not normal; sons and daughters are 
expected to house and care for their widowed mothers and unmarried daughters, 
and remarriage of younger widows is encouraged. Although banned by the Koran 
(Sura 4, Article 19), inheritance of widows by brothers-in-law was said to be quite 
commonly practised.  
 
                                                 
133 UNDP estimated in 2002 that there were 500,000 female-headed households (UNDP 2002, op cit.). Azarbaijani-
Moghaddam suggests that there are 50,000 widows in Kabul alone and up to two million in the country overall. 
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. Report of the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism Assessment Mission. Afghanistan, Gender 
Guidelines. European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. April 2002.) 
134 The author has visited courts which do not have copies of the Civil Code, although most have copies of the 
Penal Code prepared at the same time. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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Box 2. 
The Koran & Women 
 
From Chapter 4: The Women (Surah 4 – Al Nisa) 
 
Section 2: Law of Inheritance 
God (thus) directs you as regards your children’s inheritance: to the male, a portion equal to that of 
two females: if only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance: if only one, 
her share is a half. For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the deceased left children; 
if not children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother has a third; if the deceased left 
brothers (or sisters) the mother has a sixth. The distribution in all cases is after the payment of 
legacies and debts. Ye know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. 
These are settled portions ordained by God: and God is All-knowing, All-wise [Article 11]. 
 
On Widows 
If any of you die and leave widows behind, they shall wait concerning themselves four months and ten 
days; when they have fulfilled their term, there is no blame on you if they dispose themselves in a 
just and reasonable manner [Chapter 2: The Heifer (Al Baqarah) Article 234] 
 
Those of you who die and leave widows should bequeath for widows a year’s maintenance and 
residence [Article 240]. 
 
 
Extracted from The Meaning of The Holy Quran Complete Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Islamic 




The Civil Code and Female Inheritance 
 
The Civil Law was drafted upon Koranic principles, as interpreted by Hanafi jurisprudence.  It was 
finalised in the mid-1970s. Articles 1993-2102 of the Civil Law outline the procedures for 
inheritance.
135 This includes precise provision of shares for all parties (farz) including for widows and 
daughters (Article 2004). Widows are to receive one-eighth of the property, or more (one-fourth) if 
they are childless. Where there is more than one wife, this proportion is shared among them.  
 
It is of note that only after this allocation and that due to parents are made, do children then inherit 
their shares. That is, provision for the widow is the first priority – at least in the civil law. Of the 
property that remains after taking the due share for the widow(s) (one-eighth), and the share of the 
parents (one-sixth), daughters will receive one-third of the remaining estate. Sons receive two-thirds.
  
 
Authoritative commentators have observed that the shares of sons and daughters do not alter even 
when there is only one son and five daughters; the daughter(s) will share the one-third, no more, no 
less.
136 In practice, it seems to be the case that when there are no sons, the daughters do inherit 
more than the normal share.  
 
The Civil Law is also clear that wives may inherit from both their husband and members of their natal 




The situation of urban widows does appear to be somewhat easier than for their 
rural sisters. Twenty-seven widows were interviewed in Maimana City at a 
government-supported feeding centre. The cause of their widowhood was mainly 
                                                 
135 Under Part Two, Transfer of Ownership Due to Death, Topic One Inheritance, Sub-Topic One General Provisions; 
see pages 616ff.  
136 See D’Hellencourt, N., Rajabov, S., Stanikza, A. and Salam, A. Preliminary Study of Land Tenure Related Issues 
in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City. Kabul: UN-HABITAT. March 2003. However, a strict 
reading of the Civil Law does state that “male and female offspring shall receive equal proportions” and when 
there is more than one offspring (male or female) the proportion rises from 1/6
th to 1/3
rd (Article 2006). In 
addition, “one daughter shall be entitled to half the patrimony; two or more shall be entitled to two thirds” 
(Article 2008). The English translation of the Civil Law is difficult to read and this author will forego this 
suggestion in favour of d’Hellencourt’s interpretation, whose team may have read the Dari original text. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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war.
137 Only five of the 27 (18.5%) had come from rural villages. Their views 
accorded with those of village widows: 
 
“It is easier to be a widow in town. There are jobs here, you can work in 
bakeries. You can be slave in a house (sic) and get a bed that way. You can 
meet together with other widows. Village women can’t do that. There is no 
work for them to do. They may starve.” 
 
“Women are like prisoners in the rural house. They are not even allowed to 
leave the house without permission, even to collect water. They have no 
rights. They get beaten and shouted at and are kicked and beaten when the 
husband is angry. It is no better when you are widowed; your sons or 
brothers-in-law treat you just as badly as your father-in-law and your 
husband.” 
 
“Women in the rural areas have no choice. They have to marry the 
brothers-in-law. We can refuse that in the town. Elders are wiser in the 
towns and do not force widows to do things against their will.” 
 
While most women pleaded destitution and stress, many admitted it could be 
preferable to be a widow than a wife. 
 
“When you are a widow you see how you were oppressed. Husbands control 
even the money that you earn from embroidery. I get more today from 
embroidery than I got from my husband.” 
 
“It is better to be a widow these days. Elders respect those who lost their 
husbands fighting. They try to help you.” 
 
“Because we are so poor we are allowed to work and to move about the 
town. When we were married with husbands we could not do that. It is 
accepted that widows can do things that wives cannot be trusted to do.” 
 
Among the Maimana widows interviewed, a surprisingly high proportion do work; 
eight of 27 women or 29.6 percent. Around half work as domestics while others 
work in bakeries or do embroidery piecework on order from shops.  
 
Property rights 
Appendix C details the property status of the 27 widows.  In summary, prior to the 
death of their husbands most (70.3%) had been living in their husband’s house or 
with his family (father-in-law, brothers-in-law). The remainder had been living in 
rented accommodation, the homes of employers, or relatives of the wife. One had 
been homeless.  
 
Of the nine women who had been living in their husband’s house only one-third are 
still living there. Three others were evicted (two by first wives). Two others say 
they are likely to be evicted. One other was made homeless because her husband’s 
house was destroyed in fighting. The three who remain in their husbands’ homes 
say this is only because there are no male in-laws alive to evict them. 
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Among the ten women who lived with their in-laws at the time of their husbands’ 
deaths, two-thirds were evicted (seven women). Of the three women who were not 
evicted, two live precariously: one remains only through doing all the housework 
for her in-laws, while the other has been limited to one room in the house, her in-
laws taking over the rest of the house occupied previously by her with her husband 
and children. Overall, two-thirds of these wives (68.4%) have lost their homes. Most 
(58%) had been forced to return home to their natal families, while the remainder 
were either homeless or living with employers for whom they cleaned houses.  
 
Among those eight women who were living in rented, natal or other homes at the 
time of the death of their husbands, five had been forced to take up work to pay 
for the rent and/or otherwise survive. Two had moved out of rented 
accommodation into domestic work which provided a room to live in.  
 
Only five women have inherited a share of land or houses on their fathers’ deaths 
or expect to (18.5%). In two of these cases their own mothers inherited the house. 
Most (22 of 27 or 82%) have no expectation of inheriting land or houses from their 
father. In 59 percent of cases this is because their brothers will inherit land and/or 
houses; one woman had in fact inherited a share but was forced to pass this share 
to her brothers. Among the remainder (41%) this lack of expectation was due to the 
fact their fathers do not own houses, or these have been sold or destroyed in 
fighting.  
 
In summary, the lowly position of women in respect to ownership of property is 
grim but perhaps not as strikingly so as expected. Although they only represent a 
third of those interviewed, some of the women who were living in their husbands’ 
houses had in effect inherited these. A smaller proportion had inherited real estate 
from their fathers. Some improvement in the authority of widows to claim their 
rights was detected and which likely results from their greater empowerment in 
towns, particularly through taking up work and gaining economic independence. 
Because of the respect they command, and the fact that widows conjure up an 
image of maturity, attention to widows’ land rights, rather than those of women in 
general, could prove a productive and practical avenue of promotion for greater 
fairness in domestic land relations. 
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IV.   Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
A. Key  Findings 
 
Findings and conclusions drawn from this study must be read with recognition that 
the survey was of a short duration and the data accordingly are limited. Thus, the 
information that was collected must be taken as suggesting or hinting at 
conclusions, not proving these. Nonetheless, many findings endorse existing or new 
knowledge about rural land relations in Afghanistan, such as has been documented 
and commented upon previously by this author.
138  
 
The farming family does not only depend on the farm. 
 
Many rural families do not depend only upon the farm for their livelihoods. In all 
the villages visited, in this and in previous surveys, families try to supplement farm 
work if they can with returns from out-migration and off-farm tasks. Two in-depth 
studies being conducted by AREU will throw more light on these issues and offer 
considerable concrete data to support this.
139 That rural families send members 
outside the village to towns or other countries is not new knowledge, and is quite 
apparently a very long-standing practice (found to be so in both Faryab and 
Hazarajat). Still, not enough data were collected by this minor study to know 
which strata in the rural community are benefiting from remittances and from off-
farm work, what proportion of livelihoods these sources provide, or even what 
impact these sources have upon land ownership (e.g., investment in land). What 
was recorded hinted that it is mainly the better-off (like landowners) who benefit 
from out-migrating family members, as the very poor reported not having the 
means to go to large towns to seek work (let alone to Iran and Pakistan). Off-farm 
labour opportunities and benefits may in practice be similarly skewed. 
 
Landlessness is clearly significant but difficult to pin down, and homelessness 
is a serious problem among the landless. 
 
The socio-spatial nature of the rural community needs to be properly understood. 
While this study has been extremely cursory and its data indicative at best, 
questions are raised as to how “villages” are identified and sampled. This survey 
suggests that villages vary widely in their landholding character. Landowning 
families may cluster within one village (based upon an original landlord family) 
while land-poor relatives cluster in another and landless live in still other villages. 
To sample one or the other only will produce an incomplete picture of arable land 
ownership within the social community. As was found to be the case in Bamyan, 
Faryab villages surveyed do not exist as fully autonomous socio-spatial entities but 
as parts of a great social whole, a cluster of villages, locally defined as wards, or 
mantiqa. These clusters may be spread over very large areas.  
 
It may also be the case that some surveys (or rather, community leaders reporting 
to surveyors) have failed to acknowledge the presence of temporary workers, the 
itinerant farm labour noted above. Because many of these labourers do not have a 
real home place, having moved all their lives, they also do not appear in other 
village records, such as absentee families. Statistically, they may simply disappear. 
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T h e y  a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  n o t  o n l y  p o s s i b l y  very numerous within the overall rural 
population, but represent the truly poor and the core group of rural landless.  
 
With these concerns in mind, along with the paucity of data collected in the 
survey, it is difficult to confirm the most commonly cited finding of surveys that 
roughly a quarter of the rural population does not own any land.
140 This figure 
could be much higher. Most recently, the WFP/VAM survey of 2002 found that rural 
landlessness in Faryab Province ranged from 34 percent to 63 percent by district
141 
with an average of 42 percent landless households in the province overall.
142 
Landlessness in the field study districts of Khoja Musa, KSP and Shirin Tagab were 
respectively calculated as 38 percent, 38 percent and 44 percent. Data from the 
2003 WFP/VAM rural survey have not yet been compiled, but provisional figures 
suggest much lower rates of landlessness.
143 At the same time, the 2003 figures 
show that even among landowners in these areas, a significant number only own 
rain-fed fields.  
 
In the meantime, it seems fair to conclude that landlessness, whether at one- 
quarter or one-third of the population, is significant. The fact that landless people 
perceive an impassable barrier between themselves and the landed also needs to 
be recalled; this may be both a prejudice borne of many generations of embedded 
landlessness and landlordism and a frank appraisal of reality. Certainly, although a 
land market clearly existed in the villages visited by this survey, purchasers were 
virtually all already existing owners buying more land. Sellers were with one 
exception recorded as the poor, and often making themselves landless through the 
sale. This suggests continuing polarisation, already fairly marked in the rural 
economy. Another relevant finding was that the very poor (itinerant labour) did not 
list “land” as their primary ambition; for these people and homeless villagers, 
acquiring shelter of their own is more urgent (and more achievable). 
 
Similarly, the levels of homelessness among the landless in Faryab surveyed are 
just as high as in the Bamyan study and worthy of concern. The fact that many of 
the poor are itinerant workers needs concomitant attention, including by those 
who are responsible for identifying internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is easy 
but incorrect to assume that those who are not resident in their home villages are 
IDPs, something which mobile workers have used to their advantage. Without 
homes of their own, the poor lack a very basic platform of socio-economic choice 
and independence and are highly vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
Finally, the finding from the Bamyan survey that small stock (sheep and goats) 
represent the main and often sole capital asset of the landless was echoed by this 
Faryab case study. This finding heightens the importance of pastoral issues 
included in the closer discussion below.  
 
Contestation over land is rife and a major issue for peace overall. 
 
The major findings of this field study lie within the political domain. In general, 
problems in the study area around property are integral to the disorder and 
conflict of the last 25 years. Conventionally, and in early donor and administration 
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documents, the inherent strategy has been to assume that once order is restored, 
property disorder may be addressed. Two years on from the Bonn Agreement, order 
has not been achieved and property disputes have not been significantly resolved. 
In the study area they in fact became worse following the fall of the Taliban, with 
effects until the present. Direct attention to property disputes is needed.  
 
This field study also confirms the more general conclusion drawn a year past that 
attention to property matters will in itself contribute to restoring order in local 
relations.
144 That is, property problems are helping to sustain disorder and 
violence.  
 
Property problems as described in this report are clearly diverse. They range from 
issues of inequitable land access unrelated to the war of the last 25 years (or at 
least preceeding it), to problems associated with classification of land ownership 
categories and the land administration system. Clarity, prioritisation and focus are 
needed for impact. Tackling property problems through dispute resolution is an 
obvious starting point, from which wider tenure-related programming and action 
may more fruitfully proceed. 
 
Determining which disputes to give most attention is also needed. In this regard, it 
is useful to conceive of land disputes recorded by this and others studies as falling 
into two classes: those that have arisen as a consequence of war and disorder 
(post-conflict disputes) and those that pre-date 1978 (pre-conflict disputes). While 
the former may reasonably respond to restitution action to the owners of 1978, the 
latter require a more complex approach. This is because conflict over land 
ownership has been shown to have origins that while old, remain very vibrant. Any 
programme which simply restores ownership of such properties to those who held 
sway in 1978 will be not only unproductive but provocative (and likely 
unenforceable in the current climate of weak rule of law). 
 
Helpfully, the distinction between post-conflict and conflict land dispute coincides 
roughly with the two key classes of landholding: those conventionally assumed to 
be private and public properties (although as noted below this division is 
problematic itself). A more accurate designation of these estates is to refer to the 
former as individually held lands and the latter as jointly held lands, for they are 
held at national (public) or local levels (communal property).  
 
In rural communities individually held properties include houses, irrigated farms 
and shops. Rain-fed farms are more unevenly included, as rights to these areas 
appear to be more moveable where shifting cultivation in rain-fed areas occurs and 
more tenuous as to real tenure where rain-fed farming is practised in areas of 
disputable classification, such as farmland or pasture. Shared lands prominently 
include pasture (but also forests and water sources), and rights over which are 
variously declared to belong to the public, to specific communities or to private 
khan families.  
 
Pastures are often the centre of conflict. 
 
It is in respect to pastures that this field study found disputes to be most 
numerous, most heated and most difficult to resolve. It is also in their respect that 
ethnic conflict is most expressed and sustained. Further, land use disputes are 
often centred around pasture, specifically on the matter as to whether these 
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Box 4. Land Relations and Ethnic Identity 
 
Land relations are deeply coloured by ethnic identity. The central contestation over land is 
self-evidently between Uzbeks and Pushtuns. This has important class dimensions to the 
extent that the latter appear to have (to generalise) the upper economic hand over the 
other, in terms of competition for resources and income from land-based activity; this is 
most tangible in the fact that it is frequently Uzbeks who provide the labour for Pushtun 
landlords. Given that many Arab families are also large landlords, it is not surprising that 
many Uzbeks in the study area tend to lump this group with Pushtuns, and they themselves 
have felt deeply shared interests with these people. Interestingly, however, the nature of 
disputes today cannot simply be explained by the class divisions that classically mark 
antagonism and resentment between landowners and landless. Although difficult to digest, 
it does have to be concluded that ethnic identity has a great deal to do with current 
contestation over, and competition for, land.  
pastures may, or may not, be cultivated. Furthermore, pasture-related issues 
provide the most direct link to greviances from the pre-war period ― greviances 
that in fact have had a role in promoting further conflict from 1978. On the 
ground, these greviances clearly relate to inter-ethnic competition over resources. 
Analytically, they also relate to unsound public policies as to land access over the 
past century, right up until 1978. 
 
The reasons why pasture has come to represent the most contentious difficulties in 
land relations, and which are most coloured by ethnic jealousies and bitterness, 
are not difficult to find. In the first instance, by their nature as often public lands, 
pastures represent a form of open access property in conditions where regulation 
of public use falls away – the case in Afghanistan especially from the late 1980s. In 
short, these lands are effectively “up for grabs.” 
 
Second, they are by nature resources which are used on a shared, group or 
community basis. This sharing tends to have ethnic cohesion in the same way as 
villages tend on the whole to be ethnically coherent social entities. 
 
Third, pastures have also been the domain where historical inter-ethnic bitterness 
has had most power over the last half century (see Box 4). There appears to be 
resentment as to the way in which Pushtuns were granted valuable arable land 
along valleys. However, there is greater resentment among those of more recent 
arrival, who from the 1950s were able to use their toehold on the pastures to 
extend their reach into purchase or acquisition, through debt collection, of scarce 
irrigated land. A similar concern was found in parts of Bamyan Province. However, 
many of these Pushtun farmers are well established and well-known in the local 
community, which has a tempering effect. Although no firm conclusion may be 
drawn on the basis of such a limited survey, it is likely to be the case that Pushtun 
rights over farmland are “grudgingly accepted,” if ambivalently so by those who 
farm those estates for them. In respect to pastures, users and rightholders are a 
much more amorphous group.  
 
Most important of all, however, is the simple fact that pastures are held to be the 
property of specific local communities or of the dominant local ethnic group as a 
whole. These are lands conceived of as common properties and by this the most 
land sphere to provoke notions of tribal territory, of “our land.” Moreover, these 
lands are seen as belonging to the local group irrespective of whether or not they 
a r e  u s e d  a c t i v e l y  o r  f u l l y  o r  n o t .  Certainly, and the terms of state law 
notwithstanding, pastures are not locally conceived as vacant public land and 
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abundantly done over the last 50 or so years. The fact that the state has allocated 
such rights to mainly Pushtun stock owners is perceived as adding insult to injury. 
The fact that these owners are often not even local residents — i.e., Kuchis — is a 
further irritant. Finally, there is the fact that tenurial definition of pasture (“who 
owns pasture?”) is opaque and therefore vulnerable to competing versions. 
  
The debate over private vs. common property causes further tension around 
land ownership. 
 
There is an additional complexity to the notion of pasture ownership. This concerns 
the relative rights of community members to pastures and whether these are 
considered private pastures or genuine common properties. In the cases recorded 
by this survey where this is an issue, three versions of tenure pertain, and currently 
the battle for space depends upon the conflict at hand.  
 
The first position acknowledges the pasture as being owned by a local landlord 
family, as part of the domain carved out by the ancestor/s who first settled the 
area, or as granted to the family by Abd al-Rahman and following monarchs up to 
1973. This is the position which acknowledges the pasture as private property in 
the conventional sense. Certainly this is the assertion of most livestock-rich 
landlords who are finding “their” pasture encroached for cultivation.  
 
The second holds that while the landlord family may be the titular owner, they do 
not own the pasture on their own behalf but as trustee for the entire community 
which they head (or in the past were the head of).  
 
The third holds that local pastures were never privately owned but are the private 
property of the community as a whole (common property), and that while 
landlords/khans as community leaders may have the power (and duty) to defend 
those pastures against outsiders (and as those with most stock, will have the most 
incentive to do so), this should not be taken to mean that their rights are superior 
to those of other members of the community. Moreover, this common ownership 
includes the weaker and poorer members who may not own the means to use the 
pasture (livestock).  
 
Examples of where the nature of common property is being so mooted were given 
in the study, albeit with struggles over meaning expressed in contesting claims. 
These disputes may be among members of the same ethnic community, such as is 
the case in Turkul Baluch mantiqa. Or, they may arise where the “territory” or 
natural domain of one mantiqa is pitted against another, such as the case between 
Qala-i Shaikhi and Sara-yi Qala. In this case the battle over pasture is between a 
respectively Arab and Uzbek community, and issues of ethnicity both cloud and 
fuel the more pressing dispute. The dispute is being played out between leading 
khans, who claim they are the rightful owners of the disputed pasture. They are 
unclear as to whether they are making these claims on their own behalf or on 
behalf of the communities they lead, because they tend to draw no distinction 
between the two. 
 
Pastoral tenure norms are ill-defined and under challenge. 
 
The precise tenurial nature of rights which have been granted over pasture land is 
unclear. The law (Pasture Law of 1970) is not known locally. This and related 
legislation are in any event ambivalent on several counts: first, in the meaning of 
public land, which directly affects pasture; second, in the right of tenure or rights Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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which the state as administrator of public land may grant; and third, in the extent 
to which customary rights over pasture are respected.  
 
Broadly, Afghanistan statutory law holds that all pastures are public land. This 
should mean that they are owned by the nation, albeit held in trust by, and 
administered by, the state. In practice, even Afghan laws tend to imply these lands 
are directly government property. Certainly, administrations have always 
historically treated pasture as either terra nullis or government land and felt no 
constraint to allocating these lands to applicants of their choice. The status of 
these allocations as ownership rights or as just use rights, is not clear in 
documentation. The period for which holders may exercise these rights, and the 
conditions upon which they are sustained, are not detailed. 
 
As touched upon above, a main problem with designating pasture as government 
property (de jure or de facto) is that when government authority/political order 
breaks down as has been the case, those lands become virtual open access 
properties, available to those who have the means to grab them. This has certainly 
been the case in Afghanistan. Millions of hectares of property which the 
administration considers to be public land/government land are now under 
occupation, pasture included. For its part the Faryab government (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry) complains that some 28,831 hectares of 
government pasture have been invaded and that the only action now needed is to 
have sufficient force to recover these lands.
145  
 
While force and restoration of order could have this result, there are other factors 
that need to be considered. For another main problem which arises from declaring 
all pastures to be publicly owned or government-owned is that this rides roughshod 
over the customary tenurial rights and interests of local communities. As illustrated 
above, it is not unexpected and may be accepted that many, if not all, of the 
pastures of Faryab are locally conceived of as common properties, that is, the 
private shared resources of nameable social groups/communities. 
 
This survey has illustrated this case; most of the mantiqa visited hold certain 
pastures as their own. Sometimes these are owned by the mantiqa as a whole (and 
these may comprise up to five or more villages). Sometimes only one of those 
villages has rights or at least priority rights. It would be true to form to find that 
the distinction is a direct consequence of size and proximity: a pasture that is 
directly adjacent to one settlement and too small to share among too many may 
easily be considered as belonging to that village. 
 
Even much larger pastures may be claimed as more rightfully locally owned than 
nationally available public properties. This has also been shown in the survey, 
although greatly complicated by opportunism. For while the vast and remote 
pasture of Charmgar Chashma seems to be accepted by almost all as a public asset 
which all users may share and have to share, the Dasht–i-Laili is not. Over the last 
century, this resource was largely allocated to Pushtun nomads, or at least this was 
their assumption or claim. We have seen how historically Kuchis are recorded as 
“being given the Dasht.” Such favoured allocation provokes counter-claim. Had 
access rights been allocated equally or the whole genuinely held to be a public 
access area, then it may have been the case that this desert would have been 
accepted as public land. On the other hand, the important history of the Dasht-i-
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Laili in the north could have located it firmly as the privately shared property of 
the Uzbek community (“our land”).  
 
Either way, it has also been shown in this survey that the trigger to breakdown in 
acceptability of Pushtun allocation of the Dasht-i-Laili has been expansion of 
cultivation into the desert, and which has challenged Pushtun hegemony over the 
area. It should not be forgotten, however, that the first to launch this cultivation 
was the government itself during the 1980s. Greedy warlords have then proceeded 
to coopt and expand these developments, with a virtual free-for-all emerging, 
confined in practice to only those with the means (capital and labour) to exploit 
the opportunity. The case is similar for many smaller pastures.  
 
Land administration systems are too weak and confused to support clear 
norms. 
 
Severe shortfalls in the systems of land administration and issue and registration of 
land rights, in particular, complicate the situation. For example, when private 
landlords dispute ownership of the pasture, they may base their claims not upon 
the evidence of land grants, but on the fact that they have paid taxes on that land 
in the past. Afghanistan law does provide amply for tax receipts as a source of 
evidence of tenure. However, it can never be ascertained from tax receipts 
whether those taxes were levied in return for use of the pasture or on the basis of 
acknowledgement of ownership of the pasture. This is crucial, for the former 
delivers only use rights, while the latter delivers ownership. With a use right, the 
holder may not be permitted to do anything other than graze the land. With an 
ownership right, the owner could (in theory) farm the land or build houses upon it 
and sell it. In fact, the law (Pasture Law of 1970) explicitly disallows either the 
conversion of pasture to farmland or its sale, and had the law been applied, the 
distinction would not matter. In practice, however, these provisions have rarely 
been enforced. Most Kuchis and others who claim titles to pasture assume that 
their rights are those of full ownership. Their wish to retain the pasture 
uncultivated stems from their own interests, not the law. Many other claimants of 
pastureland are making these claims, precisely because they do want to cultivate 
the pastures. 
 
In any event, as this study has also shown, corruption, including by the courts 
themselves, may render such documentation as exists suspect. Loss of confidence 
in the ethnic neutrality of the courts is pronounced, with many Pushtuns in 
particular currently considering it futile to take cases to the court. Others 
indicated a more general concern; a lead official described the state of the courts 
as “dangerous” in their corruptibility and misuse by a succession of warlords and 
administrations. Warlordism itself may be blamed as a trigger to disorder and 
corruption (see Box 5). 
 
Nonetheless, the Maimana court acknowledges the proportion of land cases in their 
caseload is high, at 77.5 percent (62 land cases among 80 cases in the Provincial 
Court, Court of Second Instance). A significant number concerned alleged illegal 
occupation of farms (57%), with no pasture disputes recorded.
146 The judges noted 
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Box 5. Warlordism as a Prop to Land Tensions 
 
Outright exploitation, terrorising and land theft led by warlords (some of whom are now 
official or pseudo-official commanders) have certainly played a role in local land tensions. 
Although their motives almost certainly have been mainly personal and stem from their 
own economic interests and greed, the effects tend to have been delivered along ethnic 
lines. In short, land theft and occupation, and especially their role in greatly extending 
cultivation into pasturelands, has often been justified on ethnic grounds. These have in 
turn fed upon simmering discontentments as to land access and rights, brought by 
warlords and the general anarchy of the post-War period, to boiling point. Because of this 
land history, warlords may, however, be seen as possibly more catalyst than cause. 
Regrettably, their success in wrecking or supporting havoc in land relations may only have 
been possible and sustained because there has been as such a profound background of 
inter-ethnic tension over land resources. 
that they knew most pastures and forests in the province were under dispute but 
could not explain why so few cases had reached them.
147 
 
In principle, records of ownership in the province up until 1978 are unusually 
complete, through the comprehensive conduct of land registration by the Amlak 
Department of the Ministry of Finance at that time during the 1970s. The Ministry 
of Agriculture claims that none of the resulting Books of Ownership have been lost 
and in 1999 the Taliban, for example, prepared to use these again as the basis of 
property taxes, as was the case in 1975-1977. These statements are contradicted 
by information given to another researcher by the  the chief administrator of Shirin 
Tagab who said that the district’s ownership records were burnt by retreating 
Taliban and that they will have to be rerecorded one by one.
148  
The reliability and utility of these records even prior to tinkering is, however, 
questionable. As all over the rural areas, the books of ownership were based upon 
verbal self-reporting by landowners and not checked on the ground or by 
consultation in the area. The subsequent cadastral survey in the province in 1975-
1976 found very different facts of ownership in the 34 villages it visited.
149 When it 
came to recording ownership of land, the main surveyor in the province recalled 
that pasture was generally excluded on the grounds that “all pasture belongs to the 
government.” The surveyors did find that the majority possessed legal evidence of 
ownership in the form of court-prepared letters of ownership or subdivision 
deeds.
150 There were also a surprising number of firman or state-signed land grants 
from the 1920-1960s. In none of these cases, however, was pasture well identified.  
 
Conflicts of interest also are interwoven into land tensions. 
 
There is little doubt that loss of social and political controls over land use 
conventions has provided a real excuse and/or opportunity for challenging ethnic 
and private hegemony over pastures. Moreover, this loss of control has not only 
been from the side of the government. This survey has shown that communities too 
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have allowed or enabled local conventions to be transgressed. The result has been 
creeping encroachment of farming into lands previously held to be pastures. This in 
turn has provided one of the main triggers to the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic 
disputes that rage today as to rights over pastureland in Faryab.  
 
Several conflicts of interest interweave themselves in this development. First, 
there is an obvious environmental concern. In many areas social or legal 
restrictions against farming pastureland have a visibly rational basis; the 
disturbance to top soils resulting from cultivation may not only destroy the pasture 
itself in a relatively short time but may impact upon long-held arable lands. This 
was most clearly seen in the two mantiqa of Islam Qala and Turkul Baluch where 
floods have increasingly destroyed irrigation systems and washed away the soil, 
rendering these useless and now unfarmed. This excessive flooding is likely to have 
been caused by the loosening of hilly soils through new cultivation, increasingly 
run-off. Loss of soils through wind erosion has also been recorded in respect of the 
less hilly Dasht-i-Laili. 
 
Second, conflict of interest exists between those who have substantial numbers of 
livestock and therefore need for pasture, and those who do not. This, as we have 
seen, does not necessarily concord with an Uzbek–Pushtun or even Uzbek-Arab 
divide. Nor does it even accord with a straightforward division of interest among 
rich and poor within any or all of these groups. This is because the poor and very 
poor do not have the means to extend cultivation independently (seeds, oxen, 
plough) and rely upon richer members of the society to expand cultivation (and in 
the process provide more sharecropper jobs). At the same time, by supporting 
expansion of cultivation into previously uncultivated and open access land, they 
are depriving themselves of their one source of land access and one that only exists 
for so long as the land in question remains pasture – by nature a potentially shared 
resource. 
B. The  Way  Forward 
 
The preceding section has suggested that resolving disputes should be the primary 
focus for action in property relations and that pastures should be the starting focus 
for this development in Faryab. Use of the courts for this process may, however, 
not be appropriate. This is not just because the courts are part of the problem, as 
a programme of replacing corrupt judges and retraining new judges could go some 
way to removing this obstable. Rather it is because the issues at stake will not be 
safely decided on the basis of “legal deeds,” nor by the classical winner-loser 
approach of normal court processes. A much more exploratory process is required 
which inter alia, allows the emergence of new and workable norms (and law) and 
this is beyond the mandate or reach of the courts. 
 
The issues that need clarification have been outlined above. For example, these 
prominently include: 
•  Development of a workable and acceptable distinction between public and 
common property.  
•  Development of a rigorous definition of exactly what powers may the State 
as administrator of public land, and through what procedures.   
•  Clarification of the nature of private rights over pasture, and where it is 
accepted that individual landlords own the pasture in question, then 
definition of their rights as well as responsibilities as the privileged party 
will need definition. 
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Two outstanding questions arise in respect of working through these and other 
matters and seeing them applied. The first is where such matters should be 
decided and how. The second is whether such action may proceed in circumstances 
where warlordism and weak rule of law prevail. 
 
Accounting for history 
 
Understanding the nature and origins of this land tensions becomes important in 
seeking paths to resolution. It is for this reason that this study, while minor and 
seeking largely to capture only a snapshot of land relations in the province, has 
found it necessary to investigate and examine and record the history of ethnic land 
conflict, as presented in the first part of this report. Of necessity, strategic 
planning must account for this history. 
 
Adopting a community-based approach 
 
The conventional response to problems is to launch a national policy and legal 
development process. However, this is unlikely to be timely, implementable or 
enforceable and more important, unlikely to have sufficient localised input to be 
significantly applicable to the concerns as seen at the local level. While 
commitment to building a sound new pasture policy and legal framework is 
essential (and something which the Ministries of Agriculture and Frontier and Tribal 
Affairs are committed to), achieving this through an incremental and practical 
approach shows a lot more promise at this juncture. The key advantages of a 
localised approach is that it will allow for those directly affected to be directly 
involved; for conflict resolution and decision-making towards policy development 
to be integrated; for implementation of agreed decisions to be immediately 
applied by consensually agreed actors; for not just pastoral access issues but 
pasture management decisions and use regulation to be integral to this approach; 
for the local institutions and procedures for sustaining the agreed rules to be put in 
place; and most of all, for the community itself to become the regulator. In short, 
the need is not only for conflict resolution, but new rules and a new system for 
those rules to be applied and regulated. Such a strategy represents an integrated 
reconciliation and pasture development approach. 
 
More specifically, what is suggested would be founded upon an applied land use 
planning and action approach which begins with identification of pastures, brings 
all disputants together (including representatives of long-standing seasonal users; 
i.e., Kuchi clan heads as applicable) and facilitates resolution and compromise 
(reconciliation). Of necessity this should be through procedures which as far as 
possible set aside contested documents and events. While inter-ethnic resolution in 
respect especially to Pashtun and non-Pashtun land interests is difficult to resolve 
in ways that will be even-handed and locally acceptable, through face to face 
negotiation in relations to specific pastures, much more progress should be seen 
through a localised approach than can be achieved through a national-level 
dictate. In the field study districts, a readiness to negotiate and agree appeared to 
be incipiently emergent, with assistance, and assurity of just and fair process. 
 
Within a community-based approach, agreeing to a precise definition of the 
pasture itself would be a logical starting point, in terms of defining its perimeter 
boundary with other pastures, its status or subdivision as logically public or 
common property, and the line agreed on the ground beyond it that no cultivation 
will occur. Agreement as to who owns the pasture may need to be set aside in 
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when the pasture will be accessed, by whom, through which local reporting 
procedures and on what conditions. Distinctions and agreement on the ground 
between public and local pasture and between local and private pasture and the 
meanings of each will be more easily teased out and agreed once such use 
decisions have been agreed upon.  
 
In effect, a pasture management plan for each pasture would be developed, the 
rules subjected to community-wide approval and public record, and this agreement 
written and registered with the district governor’s office. Agreement on the 
physical limits of cultivation, procedures for handling crop damage disputes and 
fee paying by seasonal users could be among a range of workable points of 
compromise agreed.  
 
Creation by participants of a pasture management committee or land shura would 
be a natural institutional corollary. Representation, means of selection, duties and 
accountability procedures would need to be rigorously worked through, laid out, 
agreed and signed against. On grounds of proximity, residence and practicality of 
management action and regulation, these bodies should be primarily comprised of 
settled members of the community but with seasonal users represented. 
 
The logical level for such actions to proceed from would be the mantiqa, with 
negotiation with neighbouring mantiqa and seasonal users as applicable. Other 
communal properties and/or properties defined as privately owned by communal 
use obligations would need to be included, with their status and rights clarified and 
agreed. Remote seasonal pastures used by the community should also be 
addressed, inevitably involving a wider forum of users and reconciliation and 
management planning action. Non-pastoral commons traditionally used, or with 
logical potential as service centres, could be helpfully identified and entrenched at 
the same time. Consensus access registers could be established, written by 
appointed community actors or aids and subject to formal administration 
monitoring. While these consensus registers would be provisional-approved legal 
documents, they would represent a new platform of rights recognition, at the right 
time, formally endorsed by the appropriate level of court and administration as the 
new, definitive record.  
 
Obviously such a process represents more than conflict resolution in attempting to 
lay a fresh foundation of agreement and acceptance of the pattern of rights in the 
vicinity. In addition it attempts to lay the basis for reform in the way in which land 
rights are articulated, recorded, protected and managed, and crucially, through 
empowering landholders themselves. Implementation could begin and build 
incrementally, within selected districts, a handful of early pilots providing first 
guidelines of process. Success would hardly be uniform, but a gathering number of 
working successes would offer powerful examples and have the advantage of going 
well beyond declamatory policy and decrees that have proved too contradictory, 
too general or too one-sided in their implications to be of much use or enforceable. 
 
The experience gained through this practical implementation, confronting known 
and as yet unknown realities, would contribute significantly to the evolution of 
genuinely relevant paradigms for national land policy and law. If any legal and 
policy principle would need to be established ahead of such pilot developments, it 
would ideally be only in order to commit to this incremental and bottom-up 
strategy. Implementing facilitators would necessarily be carefully selected 
individuals, working as a limited number of commissions, liaising with rather than 
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appropriate Ministry of Agriculture, Tribal Affairs and Justice representation would 
need to be considered. 
 
Local disarmament as a prerequisite 
 
At first such proposals may seem too far removed from the current reign of 
disorder, lack of government, intimidation and inter-ethnic strife to be achievable.  
Realistically, not a great deal of progress is likely to be made in bringing to end 
especially ethnically-coloured disputes and the encroachment of traditional 
pastures that is precipitating these disputes or causing them, without 
disarmament. It may be necessary to disarm and disable warlords – including those 
currently afforded protection in their positions as official commanders of the 
military corps – to prevent them from derailing reconciliation and resolution 
processes. Until this occurs, it is difficult to suggest Faryab as a site for launching 
of priority or trial pasture dispute resolution processes and the concomitant 
development of new pasture tenure policies and law. However, there is a 
reasonable chance that such basic conflict resolution/systems development 
processes could be safely initiated at a modest mantiqa by mantiqa level in a 
district where peace reigns and warlordism is least. At the time of writing, among 
the three study districts, Khoja Musa District has the best potential in this respect. 
Should PRT services be afforded Maimana, their back up in this regard could be 
solicited.  
 
 Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       67 
Bibliography 
 
Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan. 
Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003. 
 
Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit. July 2003.  
 
Alden Wily, L. Land Relations in Bamyan Province: Findings from a 15 Village Case 
Study. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. August 2003.  
 
Allan, N. “Rethinking Governance in Afghanistan.” Journal of International Affairs. 
Spring 2003. 56 (1). 
 
Ali, A.Y. The Meaning of The Holy Quran: Complete translation with selected 
notes. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust. 1996. 
 
Al-Saleem, R. for UNHCR. Land Issues within the Repatriation Process of Afghan 
Refugees (Draft). Kabul: UNHCR. 2003. 
 
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. Report of the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
Assessment Mission. Afghanistan, Gender Guidelines. European Commission 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. April 2002. 
 
CSO (Central Statistics Office). Survey of Progress 1970-1971. Kabul: CSO. 1972. 
 
CSO (Central Statistics Office). Afghanistan Agriculture in Figures. Kabul: CSO. 
1978. 
 
D’Hellencourt, N., Rajabov, S., Stanikza, A. and Salam, A. Preliminary Study of 
Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul 
City. Kabul: UN-HABITAT. March 2003. 
 
Dupree, L. Afghanistan. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1973. 
 
Dupree, N. An Historical Guide to Afghanistan (Revised and Enlarged). Kabul: 
Afghan Air Authority, Afghani Tourist Organization. 1977. 
 
Emadi, H. Politics of Development and Women in Afghanistan. Karachi: Royal Book 
Company. 2002. 
 
FAO.  FAO/WFP Special Report. Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to 
Afghanistan. Kabul: FAO. 2002. 
 
FAO-UNDP. Provincial Landcover Atlas of Islamic State of Afghanistan, 1999. Kabul: 
FAO-UNDP. 1999. 
 
Favre, R. Grazing Land Encroachment. Joint Helicopter Mission to Dasht-e Laili 25-
27 March 2003. Kabul: FAO Afghanistan. 2003. 
 
Frederiksen, B. Caravans and Trade in Afghanistan: The Changing Life of the 
Nomadic Nazarbuz. Thames and Hudson. 1995. 
  Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       68 
Government of Afghanistan (GoA).  The Civil Law of The Republic of Afghanistan. 
English Translation. Kabul: GoA. 1974. 
 
Gregorian, V. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and 
Modernization, 1880-1946. California: Stanford University Press. 1969. 
 
Gupta, B.S. Afghanistan. Politics, Economics and Society. Revolution, Resistance, 
Intervention. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers). 1986. 
 
Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i-Sharif. November 
1998. 10(7c). 
 
Human Rights Watch.  Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan. February 2001. 13(1c). 
 
Human Rights Watch.  Afghanistan. Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against 
Ethnic Pushtuns in Northern Afghanistan. April 2002. 14(2c). 
 
InterSoS. Data on Ethnicity and Livestock Ownership in Khwaja Musa, Khwaja Sabz 
Posh and Shirin Tagab Districts, Faryab Province. Kabul: InterSoS. 2003. 
 
Lee, J. “The History of Maimana in Northwestern Afghanistan 1731-1893.” Iran 
Journal of Persian Studies. 1987. 25; 107-124. 
 
Lee, J.  The ‘Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 
1731-1901. New York: Brill, Leiden. 1996. 
 
Male, B. Revolutionary Afghanistan A Reappraisal. London & Canberra: Groom 
Helm. 1982. 
 
Mousavi, S. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, Cultural, Economic and 
Political History. Surrey: Curzon Press. 1998. 
 
Nawabi, M. “Women’s Rights in the New Constitution of Afghanistan.” In 
Afghanistan: Towards a New Constitution. New York: Centre on International 
Cooperation, New York University. 2003. 
 
Pain, A. Livelihoods under stress in Faryab Province, Northern Afghanistan. 
Opportunities for Support. A Report to Save the Children (USA), 
Pakistan/Afghanistan Field Office. October 2001. 
 
Pedersen, G. Afghan Nomads in Transition: A Century of Change among the Zala 
Khan Khel. The Carlsberg Foundation’s Nomad Research Project. London: Thames 
and Hudson. 1994. 
 
Poullada, L. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah’s 
Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society. Ithaca, New York: Ithaca University Press. 
1973. 
 
Roy, O. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge Middle East 
Library. 1986. 
 
SCA (Swedish Committee for Agriculture). The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. 
Sixth Report 1988 and 1989 Surveys.  Kabul: SCA. 1990. 
 Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       69 
SCA (Swedish Committee for Agriculture).  Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. 
Fourteenth Report. Kabul: SCA. June 1993. 
 
Schelhas, B. Promotion of Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Programs 
Farming Systems. Rome: FAO. 1996. 
 
Tapper, N. “The advent of Pushtun maldars in north-western Afghanistan.” Bulletin 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 1973; XXXVI: 
55-79. 
 
Tapper, N. Bartered Brides, Politics and Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991. 
 
Transitional Administration of Afghanistan. The Constitution of Afghanistan. Year 
1382. Unofficial Translation. 2003. 
 
Tyler, A. for UNHCR. Mission Report: Faryab 26
th November to 3
rd December 2002. 
Northern Return Commission. Maimana: UNHCR. December 2002.  
 
UNHCR. Property Issues in Faryab. Maimana: UNHCR. October 2003. 
 
UNHCR. More examples of property issues in Faryab. Maimana: UNHCR. November 
2003. 
 
WFP/VAM.  Afghanistan Countrywide Food Needs Assessment of Rural Settled 
Populations 2002-2003. Kabul: WFP Vulnerability Analysis Mapping Unit and 
Partners. 2003. 
 
Wilder, A. Governance/Political Issues Faryab Trip Notes. 2003. 
 
 Land Relations in Faryab Province 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit                                                                                       70 
Appendix A: Interviewees in Faryab Province Other than 
Villagers 
 
Ahmed Rama, World Food Programme 
Sakhi Mohammad, Field Officer/Officer in Charge, UNAMA 
Saiyed Habibullah, Program, Admin/Finance Assistant, UNAMA 
Mohammed Nasir Gord(??) Nasirgird?, Language Assistant, UNAMA 
Christina Goyer, Protection Officer, UNHCR 
Kahim Ismail, Protection Officer, UNHCR 
Chris Green, Local Director, InterSoS  
Fernando Resta, Adviser, InterSoS 
Inayatullah Inayat, Provincial Governor, Faryab 
Qazi Sharaf al-Din, Deputy of Appeal Court (Provincial Court) 
Qazi Muhammad Sharif, Member of Civil Court 
Qazi Asif, Chief of the Primary Civil Court, Maimana 
Qazi Habibullah, Member of the Civil Court 
Khair Muhammad, Head of the Appeal Court  
Abdullah Taghachi, Provincial Attorney-General 
Sharifa Azimi, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
 Zora Surkhabi, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
Mohammed Aslam Gudas, Ministry of Finance 
Abdul Satar Barez, Ministry of Agriculture 
Abdullah Taghachi, Ministry of Agriculture 
Mohammand Aslam Gudaz, Ministry of Agriculture 
Gabriel Fralich, IOM 
Engineer Barma, ACTED 
Abd al-Ghani, Head of Statistics, District Governor’s Office (Wulswal), Khwaja Sabz 
Posh Mohammed Sahih, Officer, Khwaja Sabz Posh 
Abd al-Qudus, Chief Surveyor, Department of Cadastre and Geodesy 
Said Usman, Surveyor, Cadastre & Geodesy 
Khal Nazar, District Governor, Shirin Tagab 
Muhammad Halim, Chief of Police, Shirin Tagab 
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Appendix B: The Governance of Faryab Province in 
November 2003 
 













1 Khwaja  Sabz 
Posh (KSP) 
Created 1990s 
out of Pushtun 
Kot by Rasul 
Pahlawan and 








area. Loyal to 
Hashim Habibi 
Mohammad Gul 
Takla, from area, 
Uzbek. An ex-
teacher appointed 




KSP. Not formally 
approved by Kabul.  
Namat Nawan, 
Uzbek, appointed 
by Rahmat Rais 






























forced to flee to 
Iran during Rasul 
Pahlawan time. 
Returned 2001, not 
approved by Kabul. 
Tends towards 








to retain five 
bodyguards. 




Junbesh, but not 
loyal to Hashim 
Habibi. 
3 Khwaja  Musa 
A new district 
carved out of 













Governor but not 
confirmed by 
Kabul. From a 
wealthy Maimana 





Uzbek, part of 
border security 
















Gurziwan and is 







robbing Pushtuns in 
November 2003. 





5 Pushtun  Kot 

















Jihadi, now loyal 




Most but not all 








   Hashim  Hashim 
Habibi; also Head 
of Faryab Military 
Council by Kabul. 
 
Junbesh but with 
strong Jamiat 
and Hisb-i Islami 
factions. 
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Police Chief of 
Maimana, loyal to 
Hashim Habibi. The 
post originally post 












I Islami factions. 
 






law of Commander.  
Fathullah, Uzbek, 
uneducated, claims 
loyalty to Hashim 
Habibi but reports 
directly to Dostam.  
 
Junbesh 
9 Khwaja  Chel 
Ghazi 
A new district 
created by 
Fatullah out of 
Qaysar 
 
Under above  Under above  Under above  Junbesh 
10 Almar  Mohammed 
Hashim, Uzbek 




Saiyed Seraj Khan, 
Uzbek, educated, 
experienced, 
supported by local 
commanders and 
elders. Affiliated 
to Jamiat but now 
claims to be 
Junbesh. 
Salam Pahlawan, 







Reports directly to 
General Dostam, 















by Mullah Mir 
Mohammad; Hisb-i 
Islami, now aligned 
to Hashim. 
Dr. Saddat, the 
only Jamiat 
commander left in 
the Province. Has 
only a handful of 
bodyguards and 
control over a 










Created out of 
Kohistan 
 
As above  As above  -  As above 
13 Andkhui 
14 Qurghan 





Districts were under Jauzjan during 1978-1998. Minor local commanders, with 
governors supporting Junbesh. Qurghan is a new district, carved out of Andkhui 
during the 1990s. Although formally still in Faryab Province, the Governors 
effectively report to Jauzjan Province (Shibarghan). 
Sources: UNAMA, this study, Personal Communication J.L. Lee. 
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Appendix C: Property Status of 27 Widows in Maimana 
 
   
NAME 
 

















1 Nazima  By  fighting 
during Taliban 
None: no 




Homeless.  No; father also 
homeless 






family in Kabul 
Evicted by husband’s 
family. Returned to 
relatives Maimana. Works 
when can. 
No; house very small, 
brothers will inherit. 
3 Sanaba  Several  years 
ago, ill health 
None: 
renting   
Living with son who 
bought land near airport, 
built small house. 
No; father did have 
land but sold it and 
escaped 
 






Homeless, living with 3 
above. Does embroidery. 
No; as above. 




Sent home; living with 
mother who has 
accommodation from 
workplace (domestic). 
Also helps work. 
 
No; father died 13 
years ago, no house 
of his own. 








Permitted to keep one 
room in house with 
children. 
No house. 
7 Mehradil Taraki  time, 
illness 
Yes: Husband 
built house for 
2 wives 
Retained her room in 
house. Bakery work 
sometimes. 
No; will not inherit as 
brother has house. 




Evicted. Has no home, no 
work. 
No; when father died 
she got share but was 
forced to pass her 
house and garden 
share to brothers. 
 
9 Hajera  Taliban; 
torture 
None: Lived in 
father’s house 
with husband 
Stayed in the in-laws’ 
house. Accepted. Does 
all the housework. 
Yes; father died and 
she and brothers 
inherited house; not 
subdivided. 
 
10 Gul  Bibi  Taliban,  killed 
by mine when 
taking water 







land of other 
people in peri-
urban village 
Still living in own house. 
Inherited it from 
husband. At first 
husband’s family 
threatened to evict her 
(“they came ten times to 
try to evict me”) but 
then the brothers killed 
in fighting and wives 
stopped forcing her to 
leave. Leader in village 






No; father alive but 
brothers will inherit. Land Relations in Faryab Province 
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to house, taken 
in and fed 
Brother-in-law gave 
small room 
No; father poor, no 
land, house will go to 
brother/s. 
12 Sister  of 
(11) 
2 years ago, 
fighting 
 
Yes: House of 
husband 
Brother-in-law still trying 
to get house. Elders 
supporting her. 
As above 
13 Abaida  After  Taraki 
time, 
Mujahidin 




Evicted immediately and 
father-in-law has since 
never seen his grandson 
or expressed interest to 
see him. Returned to live 
with brother; feels she is 
a dependent of brother, 














Evicted because of rent; 
father took her in, then 
rented house again, 
working with embroidery 
to pay rent and food. In-
laws provided no support 
for her children, now 
grown up. 
No; father poor, 
expects nothing 




time 17 yrs 
ago 
 
None: Living in 
father-in-law’s 
house 
Remained in house but 
when the father died, 
brothers-in-law expelled 
her. Now living in rented 
accommodation with 
daughters; all do 
embroidery to survive 
No; one room house 
only, will go to his 
son. 
16 Haja  No  data  None: 
Husband’s 
house, rented 
Became ill because he 
was executed publicly, 
was leader of people. 
Could not find work, now 
evicted because can’t 
pay rent. Living with 
relatives for the moment 
but will have to move 
soon. 
 
No; brother will 
inherit father’s house 
and does not want 
sister to live with 
him/his wife. 
17  Laila  1990s; no data  None: Both 
living in the 
house of her 
brother 
Brother’s house, but now 
burnt down in the war. 
Living against the wall 
that stands, no money to 
rebuild. 
 
No; deceased, and 
house destroyed. 
18  Halima  6 yrs ago, 
illness 
None: living in 
father-in-law’s 
house 
Still there “We have no 
problem, only poverty” 




19  Gulnar  2 yrs ago; war  Yes: Husband’s 
house with co-
wives 
Evicted by co-wife (first 
wife). Court supported 
first wife as Gulnar’s son 
was allowed to remain in 
the house as disabled. 
Gulnar moved to sister’s 
house. 
 
No; house of father 
destroyed. 
20  Sabira  13 yrs ago; 
fighting 
None: House of 
maternal 
uncle. 
Not evicted but went to 
mother’s house, now 
working in a house and 
gets accommodation 
(domestic).  
Yes; father died and 
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house in village 
Remains in husband’s 
house as he had bought 
it and has no parents or 
















23  Sulzar  No data  None: In  
father-in-law’s 
house 
Evicted. Lives in rented 
room 
No; house destroyed 
in fighting. 
 





Evicted by daughter of 
first wife 
No; father alive but 
house will go to 
brothers. 
 





Evicted, moved back to 
home. Living with 
brothers and their 
families. Does all 
housework. 
 
Yes; got share of land 
when father died. 
Not subdivided. 
 
26  Ana  No data  None: Rented 
house 
Stayed in house, earns 
money 
Yes; got share of land 
when father died; 
sold to sister for 
cash. 
 
27 Nigaa  War  Yes:  Husband’s 
house. Owned 
it. 
Stayed in house, no 
problems with in-laws 
because far away. 
No/Yes; mother 
inherited husband’s 
house, sold it and 
came to live with 
Nigor, so nothing to 
inherit but would 
have if mother had 
kept house. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AIMS      Afghanistan Information Management Service 
DDR      Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
Ha     Hectare 
IDP  Internally displaced person, as compared to a refugee who is 
a displaced person who left the country 
InterSoS    International SoS, a French-based NGO 
NGO     Non-governmental  organisation 
PDPA      Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
UNAMA     United Nations  Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNHCR     United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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